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ABSTRACT
According to the established theories on the life cycle of social movements, the 
Maintenance Stage o f a movement is a critical tune that marks a crossroads. One path 
leads to victory and the o thato  oblivion. The odds are strongly against victory for any 
social movement because the bureaucratic necessities for long-term maintenance of a 
movement s^hon off ^ ontaneity, excitement, and “eq>rit de corps.” Few social 
movements are totally successful and many are absorbed or cooped by established 
institutions. This study examines how the Religious Right, under the leadershç of the 
Christian Coalition, has defied the odds and has become more powerful uhüe transforming 
itself into a mainstream political organization. A carefolty planned shift in riietorical 
strategy has he^ed the Christian Coalition coopt an established institution, the Republican 
Party, rather than being cooped by it
m
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
For a group that claims to have no party afiShation, the Christian Coalition, the 
powerfiil political arm of the Christian Right, has had considerable impact on the 
American poMcal score and Republican Party politics m recent years. The group has 
been blamed for George Bush’s downfoH in the 1992 presidential election and credited 
with aiding the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. The Coalition, which claims 1.7 
imDion members (Reed, 1996a), held virtual veto power over the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1996. Studies estimate that evangelicals backed George Bush in the 1992 
presidential election at a higher rate than any other religious group and provided 29 
percent of the total Republican vote in 1994 (Moen, 1996).
As a social movement, the evangelical or fondamentalist movement has existed 
since the earty 1900s (lost, 1994) but the Christian Coalition has existed as an 
organization onty since 1989 (Clarkson, 1992a). During the 1994 Congressional 
elections, the Christian Right dominated Republican Party organizations in eighteen states 
and wielded substantial influence in thirteen others (Jost, 1994). The Coalition’s 
volunteers work through 1,500 local chapters in all fifty states (Current Biography, 1996) 
and the group’s clout influenced the inclusion of the anti-abortion plank in the Republican
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Party platform (The stealth platform, 1996).
hr ^ ite  of the Coalition’s high profile and obvious strong political mfluence, there 
has been little schola^ investigation into the communication methods the gro^p has used 
to achieve its success.
Stewart, Smith and Denton (1989) say that fow social movements are totally 
successful and many are absorbed or coopted by established institutions. This study wiH 
show that, so fin, the Religious Right and the Christian Coalition have defied this 
prediction and have coopted an established institution, the Republican Party, rather than 
being coopted by it. Two foctors have contributed to handing the Christian Coalition 
success Wrere others have foiled. First, the Coalition’s astounding success in the 1994 
elections can be directly attributed to a carefully calculated change in riietorical strate^. 
The shift Reed calls “casting a wider net” was intended to broaden the Coalition’s appeal 
and erqrand its power base (Reed, 1993b).
Other tactics involved avoiding the scrutiny of the mainstream press. The group 
does not depend on traditional media outlets to transmit messages to its audience, hr foct, 
the Coalition activety avoids mainstream media attention and reaches siqiporters through a 
network of alternative media (Conason, 1993). A lack of attention from the media usually 
qiells doom for a social movement but the Coalition’s “stealth politics” have turned that 
lack of attention into a strong advantage. This study wiH examine the commrmication 
techniques the Coalition has used so efifectivefy to turn a lack of media attention into an 
advantage.
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Literature Review
The literature reviewed for this study wiH foil into three categories: 1. 
Communication studies on social movements; 2. existing studies from various fields on the 
Christian Right and the Christian Coalition; and 3. documents reflecting the rhetoric of the 
movement.
Three valuable works on rhetorical studies of social movements wiH provide the 
foundation for this study. First is Leland GrifiBn’s 1952 article “The Rhetoric of Historical 
Movements” which poses several questions students of social movements should ask while 
studying an historic movement. GrifiBn’s study establishes three phases of development 
for an historic movement: the “Period of hiception”; the “Period of Rhetorical Crisis”; and 
the “Period of Consummation” (GrifiBn, 1952).
A second study by Herbert W. Simons (1970) focuses on the problems foced by 
movement leaders and suggests persuasive strategies for dealing with those problems. 
According to Simons, “The primary rhetorical test of the leader — and indirectly, of the 
strategies he enqiloys — is his capacity to fiilfih the requirements of his movement by 
resolving or reducing rhetorical problems” (p. 2-3).
The third study is Charies Stewart, Craig Allen Smith and Robert D. Denton’s 
“Life Cycle of Social Movements ” (1989) r^ c h  expands GrifiBn’s three phases into five: 
Genesis, Social Unrest, Enthusiastic Mobilization, Maintenance, and TermirutiorL The 
study describes each stage in detail and explains the rhetorical diallenges presented by 
each and the effects of internal and external forces on a movement’s evolution from one 
stage to the next.
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While a healthy body ofHterature exists on the study of social movements and on 
the Religious Right, very little sdiolarty work has been done in communication studies 
spedficalfy on the Christian Coalition. Most of the mformation available is from the mass 
media or from advocacy press such as Church and State, ajournai published by Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State. A book published in 1996 and titled The Most 
Dangerous Man in America? Pat Robertson and the Rise of the Christian CnaKrinn was 
written by Robert Boston, an American United staff member. The book cites examples of 
Robertson’s colorful peaking style and tendency to outlandish statements as evidence of 
Robertson’s opposition to separation of church and state, the public school system, 
women’s rights and other issues typicalfy fovored by liberals.
Other books on the Religious Right examine the political in^Kcations of the 
movement (Moen, 1995a). These studies include extensive literature detailing the 
Christian Right’s support of Ronald Reagan (Guth and Green, 1991) and an examination 
of Pat Robertson’s 1988 presidential bid (Hertzke, 1991).
Hertzke’s 1993 work. Echoes of Discontent, demonstrates the similarities between 
the 1988 presidential campaigns o f Robertson and Jesse Jackson. Hertzke, a political 
scientist, argues that, though the two candidates were from different parties, their 
campaigns were more alike than different and that both men were manifestations of 
American populism. The author describes how a new fiirm of “Gopel Populism ” has 
developed to fill a vacuum left by the weakening of local political institutions such as labor 
unions and local party organizations (Hertzke, 1993, p. 11). Strong parallels are drawn 
between Robertson, Jackson and tum -of the-cartury populist presidential candidate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Wüiam Jemimgs Biyan. The author demonstrates that populism of the mid to late 1800s 
was infused with religious fervor and passion and Bryan used religious language to make 
his populist appeals (Hertzke, 1993).
Matthew C Moen of the University of Maine is the author of several books and 
articles dealing with the evolution of the Christian Right and its political influence (Moen, 
1996, 1995a, 1995b). hr a September 1996 article, Moen examines a 1996 essay by Rab>h 
Reed to demonstrate a change in dretorical tactics from a political perpective that shows 
the movement pressing firr a more moderate image. Moen also discusses some of the 
Christian Coalition’s uses of current communication technology.
A collection of articles on the Religious Right in an issue of Sociology of Religion 
(Spring, 1995) has been republished as a book entitled The Rapture of Politics (Brace, 
1995). The authors look at the sociological and political inpact of the movement with 
some arguing that the actual influence has been overestimated while others argue the 
influence is real, formidable, and continues to grow. The collection offers a wealth of 
backgroimd information on the movement and statistics on relevant quantitative studies. 
The essays question whether the Religious Right (known by these authors and others as 
the “New Religious Right ”) is a social movement or a voting bloc and even whether it is a 
distinct movement or a sub-set of conservative Protestantism. The collection of essays 
points out a lack of a clear consensus among sociologists on the inpact, or even the 
definition, of the Religious Right.
hr a book published in 1988, Brace examines the New Christian Right (NCR) as a 
social movement from a sociological point of view. The author uses the NCR as a case
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
study to examine the accuracy o f several sociological theories on the evolution of social 
movements. Lpset’s Status Anxiety Theory, the author eplains, holds that extremist 
movements of the lower middle class are driven by a deare to regam powm* and status or 
protect it (Brace, 1988). Another theory proposes that major structural changes in a 
society produce ‘Irrational bdiavior” and that such movements are characterized by 
Hosftadlers “paranoid stjie” or an “over determined réponse” to social strain (Bruce, 
1988). Smelsers’ genesis theory breaks the process into three stps: 1. Social strain 
creates anxiety; 2. The identification of a cause of the strain; and 3. The identification of a 
solution (Brace, 1988).
Sociologists who advocate the Status Inconsistent Theory claim “status 
inconsistents,” for exanple, people with high education but low occupational attainment, 
express anxiety in ‘Irrational collective behavior” which leads to social movements. The 
“Status Defense” theory, on the other hand, holds that social movements are formed in 
réponse to a threat to a cultural groip’s status (Brace, 1988).
After explaining and examining each theory. Brace argues it is not the presence of 
a grievance that causes a movement but leaders who capitalize on a preexisting grievance 
to mobilize resources. He holds that social movements evolve when culture, rather than 
status, is threatened Threats to culture create structural strain that causes social unrest 
(Brace, 1988). Movements, the author argues, are caused by a threat to the social 
prestige of a culture rather than an individual Movements evolve as a reaction to changes 
in the social moral cultural and political environment that threaten the ability of a group 
to maintain its cukme (Brace, 1988).
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A lengthy study in the Congressional Quarterly Researcher (Jost, 1994) offers a 
detailed look at the history of the Refilons Right from the turn of the century to today. 
The article, titled ‘Religion and Politics,” provided a large part of the background 
mformation on the Coalition presoited in this study.
Several communication studies have examined the rhetoric of fundamentalism and 
its inpact on the rise of the New Christian R i^t. hr a study «camming the paradox 
between the fondamentalist apocalyptic religious doctrine and the Religious Right’s 
political agenda, Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein (1985) offer a detailed history of the 
fundamentalist religious movement and definitions of evangelicalism and fimdamentalism 
In a case study of the debate between the Christian Right and its opponents, W Barnett 
Pearce, Stephen W. Littlejohn and Alison Alexander (1987) attenpt to show that, because 
the two groups argue from incompatible premises, th ^  cannot understand, and wiH not 
accept, the moral basis of the other’s argument. This study also offers historical 
information as well as an analysis of the rhetoric of the movement.
A communication study by Charles Conrad (1987) examines the romantic rhetoric 
of the Moral Majority and describes the secular and piritual myths that frxrmed the 
group’s societal visiotL Edward C. Appel (1987) examined the rhetoric of the Moral 
Majority’s leader, the Reverend Jerry FalweH, in terms of Burke’s princple of perfection 
and used nine indexes of dramatic intensity to study FalweH’s use of tragic symbols.
Appel found Falwell’s televised discourse to be strongty dramatic and appropriate 
considering his audience of true believers bent on changing society.
Existing communication studies provide background material and historical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8context for this study’s examination of qxeeches, books and articles by Ra^h Reed, (Reed, 
1993a, 1993b, 1994,1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) executive director of the Christian 
Coalition, the writings of Pat Robertson, the founder of the Coalition (1991), and 
documents published by the groi^. Reed, the consummate politician, is well ^ oken and 
highly literate. Ifis public discourse is carefidty crafted to gain the desired result. Because 
of these qualities, his work reflects the changes in the organization as it evolves through 
the stages o f the life  Cycle.
Pat Robertson is the ultimate bdiind-the-scenes authority in the organization but 
his rhetoric is not as polished and purposeful as Reed’s. Robertson stands somewhere 
between the ‘prophet” and the ‘rirbble rouser” described by Stewart, Smith and Denton 
while Reed has evolved ftom the ‘^ bble rouser” to the “d^lomat” and may represent a 
new breed o f movement leader. This study will focus on the rhetoric of the movement 
leaders to show how the nmvement has evolved since its foundation in 1989. Finalty, 
quotes ftom Reed, Robertson and other leaders in the mass media will be used as 
examples of the rhetoric of the movemoit and as evidence of the strategies and tactics 
used in maintaining the movement.
This study examines the social movement known as the New Christian Right at the 
moment of its transition from ‘Enthusiastic Mobilization” stage to “Maintenance” stage by 
examining the riietoric of its formal leader, Ra^h Reed, and its founder and informal 
leader, Pat Robertsort The study will pull together information from a wide variety of 
sources to demonstrate how the movement has evolved from one stage to the next to 
arrive at its current state using the established theories on social movement studies as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
patterns on which to lay out the dissected segmmts. The study includes an extensive 
history of the Religious Right and biographical studies of both Pat Robertson and Ra^h 
Reed. The study will examine the communication tedmiques used by the organization to 
maintain and expand its power base and will examine the rhetoric o f the movement as 
exemplified by the woric of Reed, Robertson and other leaders to compare the language 
used in early works with more current writings and qpeedres to show a shift in rhetorical 
strategy that he^ed ease the transition between the last two phases of the movement’s life 
cycle.
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CHAPTER2
HISTORY OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
The rhetorical study of a social movement should place the movement in its 
historical context and examine the effects of society upon the movement according to 
Hahn and Gonchar (1971). To understand the rhetoric of Fat Robertson, Ra^h Reed and 
the Christian Coalition, it is inçortant to understand the history of the Religious Right and 
evangelicalism, its place in the culture of the United States, and the issues the movement 
addresses in trying to influence that culture.
Evangelicalism Comes to the New World
The Religious Right has its roots in fimdamentalism that in turn grew out of the
evangelical movement, an in^ortant part of American culture for more than three hundred
years. A definition of evangelicalism by James E. Phieddemamr, an evangelical educator,
outlines the basic tenants of the movement:
(1) Belief in the authority of the Scrÿture as revealed by God, (2) the necessity for 
each individual by fiiith to make a personal commitment to Jesus Christ Wro is 
both God and human and who died as our substitute for our sins so we can be 
reconciled with God, (3) a re^onsibility to share the good news (the evangel or 
goqxel) of forgiveness of sins through Christ. . .  (4) a reqionsibility to glority God 
by living a hofy life, with the life of Christ as our pattern ÔJaniels, Jensen, and 
Liditenstein, 1985. p. 249).
10
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EvangeKcafisoi was brought to Amnica by the Anghcans, M%rhns, Society of 
Friends, and other groiqxs Wio evolved from the European Protestant Reformation.
Baptist preachers and Methodist circuit riders put a uniquely American spin on Protestant 
doctrine and ^read it throughout the colonies until evangelicalism became a dominant 
force in American culture up to the end of the nineteenth century (Daniels, Jensen, and 
Lichtenstein, 1985).
Many early settlers were selficonsciousty Protestant and highty antirCathoKc 
having moved to the New Worid to escape religious persecution and to find religious 
freedom. Protestants have long reasted allowing Catholics access to political power out 
of fear Catholics would have more allegiance to the Pope than to the country and might 
turn the United States over to a “foreign power.” This antirCatholic sentiment he^ed 
prevent A1 Smith from winning the presidency in 1928 and was still a fiictor during the 
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960. Conservative Protestants o f the earty and mid-1800s 
aggressively can^aigned for the separation of churdi and state that was expressed as a 
policy of “ho monty for Catholic schools” (Bruce, 1988).
The decentralized form of government and the massive size of the country 
contributed to small distinct religious enclaves in sheltered cultures. These jfectors also 
contributed to minimizing religious conflict early in the country’s history (Bruce, 1988).
The issue of slavery divided evangelicals during the mid-1800s. Northern 
evangelicals were at the forefront of the abolition naovemmt while Southerners defended 
slavery as divinety ordained. Slavery and war strengthened the bond of Southern 
evangelicals and produced the Southern Baptist denomination, a mainstay of the modem
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Religious Right (Bmce, 1988).
Rise of Fimdamentalism 
The end of the 19th century saw massive changes sudi as industrialization, 
advances in scientific theory and methods, and a rise in secular education that undermined 
evangelical dominance of the national moral code and challenged the infolKbility of the 
Bible (Daniels, Jensen, and Liditenstein, 1985). These dianges caused a conservative 
reaction that resulted in the fimdamentalism that emerged in the earty 1900s. 
Fundamentalism took its name from a series of religious tracts called “Fundamentals of the 
Faith” published between 1910 and 1912 (Bruce, 1988). The movement evolved out of 
discontmit with liberal theology, the growth of religious indifference, and discomfort with 
the impact of sdence and materialism on traditional fidth (Jost, 1994). Adherents refused 
to accept modem sdentific thinking thty saw contradictmg the word of the Bible. At first, 
fundamentalists were fiiund in all Protestant denominations but, witen it became clear 
most Protestants would not be diverted from a more liberal interpretation of scripture, the 
fundamentalists left to fi>rm their own denominations (Bruce, 1988).
Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein (1985) argue that fimdamentalism was the 
product of a shift in evangelical theory to an apocalyptic doctrine known as 
prenuUennialism that presumes a steady downward ^iral in world events predicted in the 
Bible and preordained by God. Drawn from the book ofRevelations. prenuUennialism 
holds that Christ will return to establish a 1,000-year reign on earth but, before that 
happens, the world wiU exqperience progressive decline ending in a Tribulation Period in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which forces of Satan will rule. According to the doctrine, true believers wiH be qiared 
the horrors o f the Tribulation when thty are “raptured” out of the world to jom Christ.
The Tribulation wiH end when Christ returns to overthrow the Antichrist marking the 
beginning of Christ’s Millennmni of Peace or 1,000-year reign. At the end of the 
hfiHennium, Satan himself will be destroyed and the resurrection of the dead and final 
judgement will come (Daniels, Jensoi, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein point out the inqiortamce of the distinction 
between “prenuUennialism” and ‘^ ostncdllennialism” that dominated evangelicalism during 
most of the nineteenth century. PostmiHennialists believed the Millennium would begin 
once most of the world had been converted to Christianity and the Tribulation would 
begin after the hfiHeonhun. These evangelicals, believing that ^reading the gospel, or 
evangel, was necessary to bring on the Millennium, supported social welfore as a way to 
spread Christian doctrine. Prenrillennialists rejected the notion that human effort could 
influence the arrival of the Millennium believing the timetable to be preordained by God 
(Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
Though prendllenniatist theory made political activism irrelevant, fimdamentalists 
did engage in political activism in stqiport of prohibition and in the antirevolution 
movement (Jost, 1994) but the premfllennialist theory that the course of history was 
preordained led to an antiwar sentiment that came under attack when the United States 
entered World War I (Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985). The Scopes Monkey 
Trial a rise in liberal doctrine in several major religions, and dissention within the ranks of 
the movement caused fimdamentalism to founder in the 1920s and 1930s (Daniels, Jensen,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and lichtenstem, 1985).
In the 1920s, groins sudi as the Ftying Fundamentalists lobbied state legislatures 
to ban teaching evolution and agitated against communism (Wilcox, 1995) and in the 
1930s, some fimHamentaKd: leaders became vocalty racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic. 
The 1930s saw the advent of the radio preadier who would serve as a prototype for the 
future of evangelism. Gerald L JC. Smith, a fundamentalist preacher from Louisiana and 
Father Charies Coughlin, a right-wing Catholic priest from Detroit, used their broadcasts 
to eqiouse what amounted to populist foscism (Jost, 1994) and radio evangelists BiDy 
James Hargis and Carl McEntire dished up anti-communism with their heUfrre and 
brimstone (Bruce, 1988).
Events of the 1940s convinced many fundamentalists that the Rapture was 
immanent. Soviet control of Eastern Europe after Worid War D, the Communist 
revolution in China, and the reestablishment of a Jewish State of Israel were all seen as 
signs of the beginning of the end as predicted in Revelations. Fundamentalist bunkered in 
for a cataclysm that did not come (Daniels, Jmsen, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
With the growth of the electronic media, fimdamentalism made gains in the 1940s 
and 1950s and, with the dawn of the cold war, anti-communism became the movement’s 
political hallmark establishing the “gods” and “devils” and fiiithering the “we-they” 
division necessary fixr group cohesion (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989). New 
organizations such as the Christian Crusade and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade 
put a religious tint on domestic issues and painted communism as the fi>rce of Satan 
(Wflcox, 1995).
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A New Devil Emerges 
The dramatic social changes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s battered the 
fundamentalist movement and drove members forther mto their ideological bunkers. The 
penmsavaiess of the 1960s posed a threat to the morally conservative (Bruce, 1988) but, 
a new “devil” emerged to give the movement new life and a new agenda. This evil took 
the form of “secular humanism” wdiich rejects the concepts of deities, divine intervention 
and, most certainly, a preordained historical course (Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 
1985).
The following definition of “secular humanism” was provided by the Pro Family
Forum, a right-wing, “femily values” organization:
Denies the deity of God, the inqiiration of the Bible and the divinity of Jesus 
Christ
Denies the existence o f the soul, life after death, salvation and heaven, damnation 
andheO.
Denies the Biblical account of Creation.
Believes that there are no absolutes, no right, no wrong — that moral values are 
self determined and situational Do your own thing, ‘as long as it does not harm 
anyone else.’
Believes in the removal of distinctive roles of male and female.
Believes in sexual freedom between consenting individuals, regardless of age, 
including premarital sex, homosexuality, lesbianism and incest.
Believes in the right to abortion, euthanasia (mercy killing), and suicide.
Believes in equal distribution of America’s wealth to reduce poverty and bring 
about equality.
Believes in control of the environment, control of energy and its limitation.
Believes in removal of American patriotism and the free enterprise tystem, 
disarmament, and the creation of a one-world socialistic government (Bruce, 1988. 
p. 77).
This list ofbehefe was culled from the Ihimanist Manifestos of 1933 and 1973 
Wdch enjoyed limited distribution. StiU, Christian Right groiqis point to Secular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Humanism as evidence ofdiscrimmation and persecution of religious conservatives. The 
Christian Right claims Secular Humanism is a religion that enjoys protection denied 
evangelicalism under the guise of separation o f church and state. The Siqireme Court 
referred to “Secular Humanism” m a decision on freedom of refigicm and the Religious 
Right points to that reference as proof that Secular Humanism is a religion (Bmce, 1988).
After the defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential canqiaign, the 
Christian Right sank into obscurity. Activity on the issue of sdiool prayer, prohibited by a 
1962 Supreme Court decision, waned after efforts to overturn the rulings by 
Constitutional amendment foiled in 1971 (Bruce, 1988). The Roe Vs. Wade ruling on 
abortion was made in 1973 but years passed before the right-to-Kfe movement emerged in 
strength (Jost, 1994). The emerging liberal moral climate promoted an increase in 
Protestant religious schools but many argue the increase was a reaction to integration in 
the South (Bmce, 1988). However, during this poiod, televangehsm was on the rise. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, four in ten housdiolds tuned into one or more religious TV 
programs. Television preachers played a major role in popularizing and legitimizing 
conservative Protestantism (Bmce, 1988).
The Moral Majority Renews the Faith 
Several political events fostered the disaffection and disillusionment that gave rise 
to the New Religious Right. According to a Gallup poU, more than 34 percent of the 
aduk population shared Jimnty Carter’s “born-again” foith wdten he was elected president 
and George Gallup Jr. declared 1976 “the year of the evangelical” (Hertzke, 1991).
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Evangelicals were encouraged by the thought o f having “one of their own” in the White 
House but soon became disillusioned by Carter’s liberal stands on social issues. By the 
third year of Carter’s term, a group of arch-conservative poMcal activists persuaded the 
Rev. Jerry FalweH, a Baptist preacher and televangelist from Lynchburg, Virginia, to lead 
a new conservative Christian organization known as the Moral Majority. The group 
quickly became the largest organization in the Christian Right (Jost, 1994). The 
movement’s disillusionment with Carter’s too-Hberal politics provided the catalyst needed 
for the movement to grow.
FahveH was pastor o f the Thomas Road Baptist Church, one of the largest of the 
Baptist Bible Fellowshq). The Fellowsh^ is characterized by preachers who start 
churches in their homes, later rent larger qiace and, all the while, raise money to 
eventually build a church. Many of these entrepreneurs are also involved in forming 
Christian schools (Wilcox, 1995). FalweU began his ministry in an old soda bottling plant 
in Lynchburg in 1956 and by 1964, the Thomas Road Baptist Church moved into a 1,000- 
seat theater and, three years later, broke ground on a focifity that would hold 3,000. 
Services were broadcast on 392 television stations, 600 radio stations and, by 1981, the 
ministry enjoyed an annual income of $60 million. FalweU added a Christian school to the 
ministry and later founded liberty Baptist College that, in 1985, became Liberty 
University (Bruce, 1988).
The credit for the creation of Moral Majority goes to what Bruce calls the “hoty 
trinity”: Richard \Tguerie, Howard Phillips, and Paul Weyrich. With financial support 
from Joseph Coors of the Coors Brewing Company, Wtyrich had created a number of
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right-wing political action conmnttees. Ph3%s and ^ gnerie had woriced for Young 
Americans for Freedom (YAF), a conservative groiqi formed in the eariÿ 1960s and led by 
William F. Buckley. The trio was in the process of creating a network of conservative 
organizations that had become frustrated with the R^ubhcan Party to buOd a conservative 
majority to counter social and moral liberalism. Their political activity included 
supporting several third-paity candidates including George Wallace in 1972. Thty were 
the first to attempt to combine single-issue constituencies into a muhirissue movement 
and, in the process, turned to the conservative religious movement for support (Bruce, 
1988).
In meetings in 1979, Phil%s coined the term Moral Majority and Weyrich first 
used the label publicty in a presentation to FalweU and his associates. It was during this 
time that W^rich discovered his true calling and the value of direct mail He developed 
mail campaigns that addressed issues individually and sent a réponse card along with his 
messages on a qiecific issue that recçients could easity mail to their legislative 
representative. This method created the inqiression of a huge constituency without much 
commitmait on the part of the refondent (Bruce, 1988).
FalweU claimed the Moral Majority was neither a political party nor a religious 
organization (Bruce, 1988) in order to attract broad-based si^port for what he called, 
“pro-life, pro-fomity, pro-moral, and pro-American” positions on social and political issues 
(Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985). Moral Majority activists railed against Secular 
Humanism in the classroom and advocated a strong ndlitaiy (Wilcox, 1995).
Ronald Reagan reaped the benefit of the Religious Right’s increased political
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activism but his fidhire to promote ri^t-wing causes deepened feelings of discontent. 
According to Heitzke, conservative evangelicals received a lot of verbal support but few 
tangible rewards from the Reagan Revolution, “Abortions continued, pornography 
survived, and public schools remained general^ hostile to traditional feith” (Hertzke,
1991, p. 6). Reagan’s deregulatory policies also led to excesses in the marketplace the 
Christian Right finds so disturbing such as violence and commercial e?q>loitation of 
children on televiaon (Hertzke, 1993).
The Moral Majority benefited greatty from the resources ofFalweH’s electronic 
ministry, both in money and following, but the group’s influence was minimal and short­
lived. With Reagan’s reelection in 1984, the Moral Majority began to fi>ld, having seen 
failure on two major canqtaign objectives. The first objective was to become a major 
political player through fimd raising but the groiqi’s major fimd raising program, direct 
mail, lost its profitability due to increased conçetition, adverse political conditions, and a 
market saturated with solicitations from every political groi^ on the right (Wilcox, 1995). 
In 1984 the organization raised $11.1 million through the mail but, by 1988, contributions 
had declined to S3 million. The other major objective was to build grassroots 
organizations. The movement foiled in this area laigefy because efforts depended on the 
activism o f Baptist Bible FeHowsh^ pastors wto were preoccupied with building churches 
and religious schools (Wilcox, 1995).
In the Moral Majority era, the Religious Right achieved the most in education by 
following courtroom fidhues with legislative action to give special protection to 
evangelical causes such as school prayer, banning textbooks espousing Secular Humanism^
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and demanding equal time for teachmg creation science (Bruce, 1988). fo North Carolina, 
for exançle, in 1979, after a state court upheld a plan for regulating private schools, the 
state legislature passed a law stating ‘In matters of education. . .  no human authority diall, 
in any case wimtever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience” (Krvisto, 1995, p. 
8).
The decline also came in part because Reagan’s and the Republican Party’s 
continued success belied the Moral Majority’s message that the Godless humanists were 
taking over the country (Wilcox, 1995). Reagan coopted many Moral Majority activists 
by giving them low-level postions in the administration (Bruce, 1988) but, the agenda of 
the Religious Right remained unfulfilled under Reagan who was more interested m a 
conservative economic and foreign policy agenda (Wilcox, 1995). Though the Moral 
Majority began to disintegrate during the Reagan years and was bankrupt and disbanding 
by 1989 (Wilcox, 1995), the Religious Right’s disaffection set the stage for Pat 
Robertson’s presidential aqiirations and the subsequent creation of the Christian Coalition.
Moral Majority leaders blamed the GOP’s feihure to address sodo-moral issues for 
the party’s poor showing in 1982 congressional elections but took credit for the Reagan 
landslide in 1984 (Bruce, 1988). Analysis of both the 1980 and the 1984 presidential 
elections show that the Moral Majority foiled to mobilize the huge block of voters FalweU 
claimed would refond to his traditional religious ideology (Conrad, 1983). However 
minimal its actual inqiact during its existence, the Moral Majority gave the Religious Right 
a taste of political power and served as the basis for the formation of the more powerful 
and effective movement to foUow.
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Though the Moral Majority billed itself as a political powerhouse, its actual clout 
was later shown to be ecaggerated. Studies mdicated the Religious Right brought in only 
6 percent of the vote hr the 1980 presidential election (lost, 1994). American Coalition 
for Traditional Values, the umbrella organization including the Moral Majority (Bruce, 
1988), claims to have registered 150,000 voters in North Carolina in 1984 for the 
senatorial battle between Republican Jesse Hefans and the popular Democratic governor, 
Bm Hunt. But, registering and voting are different acts and the actual effect o f the 
registration drives has been questioned. Studies of elections targeted by the Moral 
Majority show little difference from those not targeted. However, one area in ^ Miich the 
Moral Majority had serious inq*act was in financing. Pumping money into the can^aigns 
of chosen candidates allowed those candidates to do better than they would have without 
the additional support. An exan^le is the 1984 Helms campaign where he received money 
and support from the Moral Majority that aided in his victory over the popular Hunt 
(Bruce, 1988).
Christian R i^ t groups gave little mon^r directly to candidates but qtent large 
amounts on negative campaigns, which have no legal spending limits, against liberal 
candidates. A great amount of resources were ^ent on general sensitizing campaigns and 
on voter registration that meant indirect support for candidates. In 1980, all Christian 
Right groups combined qient less than $500,000 for Democratic candidates, $1.3 million 
for Republicans, $100,000 against Republicans and $2 million against Democrats. That 
year, of twenty seven congressional liberals targeted, twenty three were defeated (Bmce, 
1988). Most of the $2 million qient in negative campaigns was against six liberal
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Democratic senators, four of whom were defeated. The Moral Majority and other 
Religious Right grotps targeted liberal candidates and made pubfic their records on 
“moral” femüy values issues. To aid this process North Carolina’s Hdms would often 
attach amendments on sodo-moral issues to unrelated bills so his opponents would be 
forced to go on record voting against “ftmily values” issues. Congressional report cards 
would then report these votes and the records became fodder for negative ad campaigns 
(Bruce, 1988).
Moral Majority leaders also introduced a concept Pat Robertson epouses today, 
that modem interpretations of the Rrst Amendmoit mandate for separation of church and 
state have barred the righteous from access to political power while allowing the “evil” 
pseudo-religion of Secular Humanism to dominate political decision-making (Conrad, 
1983). The idea that “moral ” Americans could, and should, counteract this evil influence 
by taking an active part in local and national politics was here to stay.
Pat Robertson Runs for President 
Pat Robertson was bom the son o f a Wginia senator in 1930. He was educated 
in prep schools, entered Washington and Lee University at age 16, and graduated Magna 
cum laude. He traveled Europe as a young man drinking in culture and good times. He 
served in the militaiy during the Korean War where he was dubbed “division liquor 
officer” by his buddies. He never saw combat and later feced charges that his fether’s 
influence kept him from the heat of battle. After the Marines, his fether treated Robertson 
to another tour of Europe before he entered Yale Law School At Yale, he led a weH-
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documented hedonistic lifestyle. K s peifennance m law school suffered and he foiled the 
New York bar exam. He abrtptty married AdeKa Elmer (Dede) a nursing student, ten 
weeks before their first child was bom. After graduatmg firom Yale, he joined the New 
York mvestment company W. R. Grace, hopmg to make a quick fortune. He resigned in 
less than a year to start his own company but it fidled.
By to his own account, Robertson was a discontented young man and pirituaDy 
hungry. GQs mother, who was active in fimdamentalist cfaurdies, introduced Robertson to 
Comelius Vanderghreggen, an itinerant preacher, who wimessed to Robertson in classic 
bom-again foshion. The next day, ‘laughing, rejoicing that he had been saved,” Robertson 
began a new life and demonstrated his rebirth with gestures such as pouring “a bottle of 
Ballantine Scotch down the drain.” Robertson enrolled in Biblical Seminary of New York 
and was introduced to the “peaking of tongues,” and other signs of active foith (Hertzke, 
1993, p. 82).
Robertson’s piritual joumey ultimate^ took hhn back to Virginia where, in 1959, 
he purchased a defimct television station for $70 and began preading the word. From 
there he launched the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) wiiich would serve as a 
model for modem television ministries. The flagshp of the CBN was the “700 Chib” that 
got its name firom a 1963 fimd raising campaign that asked for 700 viewers to put up $10 
each to sustain the ministry (Hertzke, 1993).
Robertson’s brand of evangelicalism is known as Charismatic religion 
characterized by paranormal encounters such as glossolalia, prophecy, miracles, and foith 
healing. Charismatic religions rpresent a form of protest against the modem emphasis
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on fimctional rationality. The Charismatic or Pentecostal movement that evolved at the 
turn of the century was embraced by blacks and Writes and was associated with the lower 
class. But Robertson’s conversion to PentecostaHsm represented a move “down” in social 
status at a time when sipematural religion was on the rise and its appeal was preading to 
millions (Hertzke, 1993).
Over the years, Robertson’s mhristry grew at an amazing rate. CBN added 
satellite broadcasting capabilities in 1977 and four years later began broadcasting as a 
cable channeL From there, Robertson developed The Fanrity Channel that broadcasts old 
programs such as “Leave it to Beaver” “Waltons” and “Lassie” and other programs edited 
for moral content (Hertzke, 1993). At its peak, CBN reached 16 million homes per month 
and the 700 Chib logged 4 million prayer calls. This formidable reach convinced 
Robertson that, if properly mobilized, religious conservatives could take over the 
Rpublican Party. A hfolong Democrat, Robertson switched parties during the Reagan 
years (Hertzke, 1993).
With the end of the second Reagan administration, Pat Robertson saw an 
opportunity to cpitalize on his massive following. Earty efforts to get signatures on 
endorsing petitions for his canpaign for the RpubUcan presidential nomination were 
largely church-based. The campaign mounted a highfy successful fimd raising drive 
through lists of ministers, evangelical associations and CBN contributors. But, Write 
theological conservatives held a long-standing supicion of politics. Robertson had to rely 
on a “"para-churdr ” network of CBN viewers, religious activists, abortion activists, and lay 
congregational members willing to organize follow parishioners (Hertzke, 1993). The
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campaign built a networic of local pastors, pro-life activists, and CBN viewers and enjoyed 
the support o f members of the “siper churches,” large charismatic Assemblies of God 
congregations. The campaign often used dmrch fedKties to pass out literature and sign 
up supporters and went largety undetected by opponents until Robertson’s support in the 
Iowa caucus doubled projections (Hertzke, 1991).
Although Robertson pent the largest amount in U.S. history on his bid for the 
nomination, he won only 35 delegates to the GOP national convention, the worst doHar- 
to-delegate ratio in recent history (Wilcox, 1995). Robertson was beaten by George Bush 
in every demographic group, including ftmdamentahsts, even in Robertson’s home state of 
Virginia (Bruce, 1988). While Robertson’s overall performance in the nomination race 
was grim, he did score some successes. He raised nearly $30 million in contributions and 
matching fimds, second onty to George Bush’s campaign. He received noore than one 
million votes in GOP primaries and caucuses, nine percent of the total He scored major 
victories in caucuses in Hawaii, Alaska, Nevada, and Washington and made repectable 
showings in Iowa, Nfichigan, and Nfinnesota (Hertzke, 1991). However, the resuhs were 
minuscule compared with the total numher of voters. Robertson fiiiled to attract a large 
block of support outside the super churches and he remained a highly controversial figure 
Wio was seen as a detriment to the GOP. IBs own canpaign manager, Marc Nuttle, 
labeled him “a little radioactive” (Hertzke, 1991).
His campaign strategy involved two main goals: (1) to pack state caucus and party 
meetings with Robertson fthhfiils, and (2) to broaden Robertson’s appeal to compete in 
states with primaries (Mfilcox, 1985).
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The first objective was accoopHshed very well, to the dismay of Rpublican Party 
regulars. Robertson did well in many of the caucuses because his active and committed 
following was willing to show ip  and be counted (Bruce, 1988). IBs earty successes in 
Michigan sturmed party veterans and sent the Republican party into a year-long struggle. 
While the Moral Majority had enjoyed the support of the poHtica% powerfiil Southern 
Baptists, Robertson’s influence was among the evangelicals and charismatics (Wilcox, 
1995). The Southern Baptists may have agreed with Robertson’s politics but they looked 
down on his rehgion (Hertzke, 1991). Georgia’s “Country Chib” regulars were offended 
by the audacity of the newcomers (many were former Democrats) who epected to share 
power and authority, hr North Carolina, fist fights broke out when Robertson delegates 
were disqualified fi’om the 4th District Convention, hr Oklahoma and Nevada, Robertson 
forces elected state party chairs who later fiiced charges of inconpetence. In Arizona, 
Robertson backers helped write a highly controversial state platform declaring the United 
States a “Christian nation” and asserting that the constitution created a “republic based 
upon the absolute laws of the Bible, not a democracy” (Hertzke, 1991, p. 19).
The second canpaign objective, to broaden support to achieve success in the 
states that held primaries, was not acconplished for several reasons. For one, the Bush 
organization, working firom the strength of the Reagan legacy, was tremendous^ effective. 
Also, a series o f scandals seemed to conpire to make Robertson’s brand of religion 
socialfy unacceptable. Pediaps most damaging was that, during the campaign, Robertson 
was forced to settle a liable suit involving uang his fother’s influence to avoid military 
action in Korea and it was revealed his marriage ficense was doctored to conceal the fiict
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his wife was pregnant when thty manied (Wilcox, 1995).
Other scandals involvmg televangelists suifeced within months of the election and 
damaged the Robertson campaign. Jimmy Swaggart fell from grace after being caught 
with a prostitute, the Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker sex and fraud scandal erupted (Bruce, 
1988), and Oral Roberts claimed God would take him home ifhe didn’t raise $6 million 
(Hertzke, 1991). All of these events aggravated doubts about the legitimacy of 
televangelism and the honesty of its practitioners. Robertson’s canpaign strategists 
attempted to distance him from the scandals by dunging his image from televangelist to 
successfiil communications executive whose business happened to be religious 
broadcasting but the distinction was lost on the electorate (Bruce, 1988). Robertson was 
also outdone by his own overconfidence in himself as God’s vdiicle (Hertzke, 1993). This 
overconfidence led to what his campaign operatives lamented as Robertson’s “fimny 
focts,” such as accusing Bush of being behind Swaggaxt’s down foil (Hertzke, 1991) and 
statements that he knew the Soviets still had missiles in Cuba (Cantor, 1994).
Following Reagan’s lead, the Bush canpaign effective^ coopted Robertson 
supporters after the 1988 nomination and even recruited Robertson as a substitute peaker 
for Bush during the remainder of the canpaign (Hertzke, 1993).
While Robertson’s political canpaign foiled, his religious empire continues to 
thrive. Today the organizations under Robertson’s control include the Christian 
Broadcasting Network, the Family Channel cable network. Regent University that trains 
bom-again broadcasters, educators, lawyers, and ministers, and the American Center for 
Law and Justice, run by Regent University lawyers, the Religious Right’s answer to the
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American Civil Uberries Union (Fineman, 1993). These organizations continue to give 
Robertson an audience and a following that serve as the basis for the Christian Coalition’s 
power.
The Genesis of the Christian Coalition 
Robertson used the mailing list from his canpaign to form the Christian Coalition 
in October o f 1989 (Clarkson, 1992a) and began to move quietly but effectively to control 
the future o f religious conservatism and to take control of the Republican Party 
(Comason, 1992). He met Ra^h Reed, the executive director of the Coalition, at a 
banquet during Bush’s inauguration in January 1989 when Reed was only 27 years old. 
Over dinner, Robertson revealed his plans for a new organization to replace the collapsing 
Moral Majority and soon thereafter, Reed wrote a memorandum on how the new group 
should be run (Barrett, 1993). Nine months later, Reed was putting the propectus into 
practice as the Coalition’s executive director (Barrett, 1993).
As a student at the University of Georgia, Reed wrote a weekly column for the 
college newpaper as a “ftre-eating Rpubfican” and rushed ip  the student leadershp 
ladder winning the chair of the school’s College RpubKcans and, soon after, of the 
statewide organization. In the summer of 1981, he served as a Senate intern and remained 
in Washington for a semester to work with the National College Rpubhcans. Back at 
school in 1982, he was fired from the school p p er for plagiarism but continued his work 
to establish a conservative student movement (Barrett, 1993).
Reed showed a penchant for sudden self-reform in his eaify career. He was a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
heavy smoker as an undergraduate but one day pitched his pack of Marlboro Lights out a
car window and never bought another. Booze was also a problem, so he went instantly
diy duimg the summer after graduation. Weeks later, he was seized by a thirst fi>r “deeper
piritual meaning” in his life. Reed chose a church at random from the Yellow Pages,
went there the next morning, and soon became a bom-again Charismatic, abandoning the
Methodist foith of his upbringing (Barrett, 1993). hi his recent book. Politically
hicorrecL Reed gives an account of his conversion:
One Saturday, after an evening of socializing with friends, I felt a gentle tugging in 
ny  conscience that I should start attending local church. New to the area and not 
knowing wtere to go, I walked to a phone booth at a restaurant on Capitol H31 
and flipped through the yellow pages. My finger fell by a listing for an evangelical 
church in the suburbs just outside Washington. The next day, following moming 
services, the pastor led an ahar call for those desiring to have a closer relationsh^ 
with Christ. I raised n y  hand in affirmation and began a new life of fiiith (Reed, 
1994, p. 26).
After graduation, Reed went back to Washington for a job with the National 
College Republicans. After a successful stint as executive director, he moved to Raleigh, 
N.C. and set ip  a conservative evangelical organization called Students for America. The 
group was involved in the country’s hottest Senate race; the 1984, Jesse Helms Vs. Jim 
Hunt race, wdrich saw Helms reelected. Reed attended Emory University on a scholarship 
and received his Ph.D. He had phmned to abandon politics for a more stable career in 
academia until his fotefiil meeting with Robertson (Barrett, 1993). According to Reed, 
the memo he wrote for Robertson after that meeting said that the new group nmst tread 
new ground by building a grassroots infrastmcture all the way down to block captains and 
it must avoid the strategy of seeking to gain influence by merely assembling a huge mailing
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list (Reed, 1994). The memo contmued:
There exists in American politics today a tremendous vacuum that must be filled. 
Estimates on the number of evangelicals range firom a low of 10 mflfion to a high 
of40nriHion. Whatever the actual number, there is no constituency in the 
American electorate with greater explosive potential as a political force. Nor is 
there any constituency of comparable size and a ie r^  so pitifiilty unorganized and 
uneducated (Reed, 1994, p. 2).
The memo recommended mobilizing evangelicals and “their Catholic allies,” 
steering clear of controversial figures, and avoiding a “phhual litmus test” for 
membershp. Reed suggested that by 1992, he could construct an organization with 3 
million members and chapters in 350 of the 435 Congressional districts. AH this would be 
accomplished with a field staff of fifteen fiiSrthne recruiters and an annual budget of $10 
million (Reed, 1994). The goal of the organizational structure would be to enfranchise 
“one of the largest and most under-represented constituencies in the United States” (Reed, 
1994, p. 2).
The half century of retreat of evangelicals from social and political action that 
followed the Scopes Trial of 1925 had many profound consequences for American 
society. Yet surety none is more inpoitant than this; we have now had two full 
generations of Bible-believing Christians. . .  with virtually no hands-on experience 
in the political decision-making process (Reed, 1994, p. 3).
hi his book, Reed said the Christian Coalition was started with $3,000 in
contributions from personal fiiends. Robertson loaned the Coalition the money for the
first fimd raising letter and, by November 1989, the group raised $82,000 and had signed
up 2,000 members. This type of phenomenal growth and astute fimd raising would
characterize the Coalition over the next eight years. Under Reed’s direction, the Christian
Coalition learned valuable lessons in what strategies worked and uiiat traps to avoid by
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looking at the successes and fodures of its forerunners. A poweifol player m American 
politics was created and began its legendary rise.
The Issues
A social movement is defined by its agenda, the issues it sippoits or opposes, and 
its members shared behefo (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971). Opposition to abortion might 
appear to be a unitying issue for religious conservatives but, recentty, Reed and other 
Religious Right leaders have attenpted to broaden the movement’s scope to attract 
broader support. Other issues include:
1. Opposition to perceived challenges to traditional moral values. These 
challenges include pornography, equal rights for homosexuals, condom distribution in 
schools, sex education that does not enphasize abstinence, violence and sex in 
entertainment and, the National Endowment for the Arts (Beck, 1992).
2. Promotion of private school voudiers. The Religious Right believes the 
current public school system is a monopoly controlled by a leftist teachers’ union and 
advocates public sipport of private instructimi (Conn, Sept., 1993, p. 10).
3. Support for the two-parent fonrity model witere one parent stays home with 
younger children. The Religious Right sees taxes and welfore as biased in fovor of single­
parent fomilies, opposes taxation offonrihes with children, and is against federal chHd-care 
legislation because it would encourage mothers to work (Beck, 1992).
4. Opposition to higher taxes and all forms of additional government pending 
including, and epecialty, welfore. However, the Religious Right backs off firom dealing
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with economic issues that cause mothers to work and children to be aborted (Beck,
1992). The groip opposes a federalty fended breakfost program on the grounds that it 
violates fonrity values and is “socialist” (Siberi, 1993).
5. OppoAion to the fondly leave act because it would benefit working mothers.
On the other hand, thty sipported a measure that would encourage parents to stay home 
for six years. The reasoning is that businesses might not hire women of childbearing age 
to avoid the cost of parental leave (Beck, 1992).
6. Sipport for voluntary prayer in schools and other forms of religious expression 
in public (Christian Coalition presents, 1995).
In 1992, Christian Coalition members worked on the state level getting themselves 
elected as Republican National Convention delegates to make sure their voice was heard 
(Hertzke, 1993). Activists unseated incumbent GOP county committee members in 
contests across the country (Clarkson, 1992b). The Christian Right brought its influence 
to bear to make sure the Republican Party platform included hard line positions against 
abortion, homosexuality, pornography and AIDS prevention. Although not as radical as 
the platforms from some state conventions, the GOP platform adapted by the convention 
in Houston, Texas, in August 1992 embraced Christian Right positions on public prayer, 
the national religious heritage, and fiunity values. The platform criticized the media’s 
“assault” on traditional values, asserted that the “unborn child has a fimdamental right to 
life which carmot be infringed,” opposed programs in public schools that provide birth 
control or abortion services, denounced efforts by Democrats to redefine the traditional 
American fomüy, opposed sexual preference as a protected minority, and opposed same-
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sex marriages. The idea of distributing clean needles and condoms was denounced as a 
solution for stoppmg the ^read of AIDS and education stressing marital fidelity, 
abstinence, and a drug-firee hfost^e was advocated. The platform called for a national 
crusade against pornography and condemned the use of pubfic fimds “to subsidize 
obscenity and bla^hemy masquerading as a it” The platform supported the rights of 
students to pity in school and supported pubfic sdiool voudiers (Hertzke, 1993, p. 168).
The New Christian Right and the Christian Coalition have evolved firom the 
Protestant religious heritage that served as the foundation for the United States, its form 
of government, and its dominant culture. With its roots planted firmly in populist 
movements of the past, the NCR is a reactionary movement to dominant liberal culture of 
20 to 30 years ago. Its strength and depth maybe a reflection of the extreme of the liberal 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s that the movement was bom to counter.
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY
Griffin (1952) asks how a student should go about the process of exanrining a 
movement. In answering his own question, the author suggests the proper method may 
involve, “turning the movement on a qiit, as it were, by piercing it now from one angle, 
now from another, as the movement ^irals to its consummation” (p. 188). One might 
also describe this method as “taking snapshots” of a movement at a qiecific point m order 
to see how the movement came to be and where it is going. Griffin’s 1952 article, “The 
Rhetoric of Hstorical Movements,” poses several questions that students of social 
movements should ask while studying an historic movement and sets finth three phases of 
development. The first of these phases is the Teriod of hiception” when the public 
becomes aware of a problem or a need frir change and sufficient discourse is generated to 
initiate a movement. Next comes the “Teriod of Rhetorical Crisis” when “one of the 
opposing groins o f rhetoricians. . .  succeeds in irrevocabty disturbing that balance 
between the groups which had existed in the minds of the collective audience” (p. 186). 
Last is the “Period of Consummation ” when the movement is abandoned either because 
the cause has been won or because no hope of success exists (Griffin, 1952).
Simons (1970) discusses Griffin’s theory and suggests a method fr>r apptying it by
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
studying the rhetorical dilenmias fiiced by leaders of social movements. “The primary 
rhetorical test of the leader — and indirectly, of the strategies he ençloys — is his capacity 
of fiilfiOing the requirements of his movement by resolving or redudng rhetorical 
problems" (p. 2-3). These requirements are: 1. To attract and maintain fiiUowers or 
workers; 2. To secure the adoption of their product or message by society; and 3. To react 
to external resistance. The success or fidhire of a movemat and its leaders can be traced 
to the success or foihire in meeting these ih^orical demands. Meeting these requirements 
create rhetorical problems whidi the leader must develop dietorical strategies to address 
(Simons, 1970). “By enumerating dietorical requirements, theory identifies the ends in 
light of which dietorical strategies and tactics may be evaluated. By suggesting 
parameters and directions to the rhetorical critic, theory places him in a better position to 
bring his own sensitivity and imagination to bear on anatyses of particular movements” 
(Simons, 1970, p. 2).
In 1971, Hahn and Gonchar proposed a methodology fiir dietorical anatysis of 
social movements that took both GrifiBn’s and Simons’ theories a step fiirther. Hahn and 
Gonchar stated that movements can be defined by shared behefo in an inequity in society 
and socially shared activities directed toward addressing that inequity. The dietorical 
study of a social movement should place the movement in its historical context and 
examine the effects of society upon the movement The authors demonstrate how the 
movements can be studied by examining the “intertwining of finir traditional categories of 
analysis, (ethos, logos, pathos and st>ie). . . ” (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971). Examining the 
“ethos” involves discovering the movement’s ideal member or by identifying the kinds of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
antagonists thty choose to vilify. A study of the “logos” of a social movement looks at 
the undeifying premises that unite the members in one world view. The^ecific 
arguments expose the movement’s philosophy and epistemolo^ and patterns of evidence 
indicate shared values. An anafysis of ““jpathos” wiH “ seek to discover iMdch emotions the 
movement appeals to, whidt it ignores, and the targets o f emotional appeals” (p. 50). The 
rhetorical style o f a movement is significant because, while the ^edfic attitude of the 
group may not be immediately recognizable, it can often be identified by a stydistic analysis 
of recurring images and metaphors (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971).
These foctors interact with each other and that interaction can also be the subject 
of dietorical examinatioiL The intertwining of logos and ethos can be seen in the effict of 
logical contradictions upon ethical appeal The pathos and ethos can interact either to 
damage the movement by appealing to “unapproved” emotions or enhancing movements 
by playing upon acceptable emotions. A movement’s ethos can also be enhanced or 
damaged wken judged by the movement’s st^istic tactics (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971).
In “Life Cycle of Social Movements,” Stewart, Smith and Denton (1989) pull 
together previous methods and exqiand Griffin’s three phases to five: Genesis, Social 
Unrest, Enthusiastic Mobilization, Maintenance, and Termination. The “Genesis” stage, 
as described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton, begins during relatively quiet times when the 
public has little awareness of the issue the movement will address. During this stage, 
scattered individuals become aware of a problem or “In^erfection” and become restless 
with the need for change. These earfy leaders are the “prophets” of the movement, 
intellectuals who strive to inqirove or perfect society.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
The Genesis Stage may last for months or it may last for decades but h is during 
this stage that the “apprehension of an exigence”— the acknowledgment of a social wrong 
— emerges and enters the consciousness of an audience. This step is vhal to the creation 
of a social movement (Steward, Smith, and Denton, 1989).
A triggering event is needed to propel the unorganized, generally invisible 
movement from the “Genesis” stage to the “Social Unrest” stage. A triggering event is a 
qiecifrc incident that gives the disbursed individuals a means for focusing their 
dissatisfoction. For exarrgde, a triggering event may be new legislation, a court decision, 
an accident, military action, diqiaraging comments by opposition leaders, or the 
publication a book which consolidates the movement’s views. Stewart, Smith and Denton 
(1989) refer to a comment by a North Dakota legislator to a form delegation in 1915 to 
“Go home and slop your hogs, ” that incited formers and triggered the formation of the 
Nonpartisan League in the NGdwest (p. 23). A triggering event does not create the 
dissatisfoction or the “apprehension of an exigence” that brings about a social movement, 
it merety provides a rallying point that brings restless individuals together to express their 
concern.
As more people express frustration and call for a resolution to the perceived 
problem, the movement passes into the “Social Unrest” stage. Manifestos or 
proclamations are issued that describe the movement’s purpose and needs and establish 
the gods to be served and the devils to be banished through the movement’s work. During 
this phase, the movement attempts to bring change by working through existing 
institutions in society. At this point, the mass media begins to take notice of the
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movement and established social institutions may move to stigmatize or trivialize the 
movement and its cause, hr response to this pressure, the “prophets” of the genesis stage 
turn into, or are replaced by, “agitators” who attempt to organize the elements of the 
movement to demand change.
When change does not come, frustration leads to disaffection with established 
institutions and the movement enters the stage of “Enthusiastic Mobilization.” During this 
stage, the movement abandons atten^ts to bring about dtange through established 
channels and takes to the streets. Increased resistance from the institutions causes the 
movement members to ban even more tightty together to combat the evil forces from 
without. During this time the movanent expands at a rapid rate as agitators demand, and 
receive, more and more attention from the mass media. However, with or without 
meaningfiii progress, the movement wiH eventually stall ffno significant progress is seen, 
followers become frustrated and disiHuaoned. If the establishment partialty concedes to 
the movement’s demands, the movemoit can firagment wdule searching for a new central 
issue to address.
If the movement survives the waning of the “Enthusiastic Mobilization” stage, it 
moves into the “Maintenance Stage.” The Maintenance Stage is a critical time for a social 
movement as it marks a crossroads with one way leading to victory and the other to 
oblivioiL The odds, the authors say, are against victory because the bureaucratic 
necessities for long-term maintenance of the movement siphon off ^ ontaneity, excitement, 
and “esprit de corps. ” Leaders resort to ceremonies, rituals, and celebrations 
memorializing significant events in an attempt to hold the movement together. During this
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phase, leaders hold on in hopes a new triggering event will bring about a new phase of 
Enthusiastic Mobilization and new life to the movement.
Failure to find a new triggering event eventually leads to the ‘Termination” stage. 
Rarety is a movement totally successfiil and rarely do they totalty disband. Most shrink 
into other, smaller organizations while others are coopted by external institutions. The 
rare movement that does succeed is adopted by society at la^e as the new order and the 
movement becomes the establishment. Much more often, movements shrink or die or are 
transformed into something else entirety. The disintegration of a movement can be traced 
to its fidhire to meet the dietorical demands (Simons 1970).
A major rhetorical problem addressed by the leaders of the New Religious Right 
involved encouraging their fiiHowers to register their discontmt through political 
mobilizatioiL Sociological theories suggest that some cultures promote a fetalistic 
resignation in the fiice of ndsfiiitune, misery, or oppression. Another set o f theories 
contend that the manipulation of powerfiil symbols o f state authority or the existence of 
dominant ideologies effectively intimidates lowty individuals into silence. A third suggests 
that collective action is inherentty difficult eqiecialty fiir the less well heeled. Those with 
the most to gain through collective action are the hardest to organize and have the least 
money available for political struggle and are most tempted to be “free riders” by letting 
others fight for them. Lower classes use more of their resources in money and energy in 
work and care of the fiunity and have less energy to devote to political activism (Hertzke,
1993). These fectors are confounded in the case of religious conservatives wtose feith 
teaches a fetalism and a belief that problems o f the earth are of little concern to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
f  iritualty fiilfiDed.
In f  ite of the problems inherent in mamtainmg the momentum of a social 
movement over time, e f  ecialty a movement targeted primarity at the lower classes, the 
New Christian Right’s power and influence has continued to grow along wfth its 
membershf and resources. Few social movements have enjoyed successes that come 
even close to the accoofhshments of the NCR under the Christian Coalition.
According to Foss (1989), the most significant purpose of rhetorical criticism is to 
make a contribution to rhetorical theory or to explain how some aspect of dietoric 
operates. Rhetorical criticism can be used to confirm exdsting princf les or suggest 
changes. This study wiH attenft to do a little of both. First, this study will demonstrate 
how the New Christian Right has evolved in accordance with the Stewart, Smith, and 
Denton model, and second, show how movement leaders have addressed the problems 
presented at each stage and the strategies that have contributed to the movement’s success 
in keeping with Simon’s theory on leadershf. However, this study will also examine how 
violating some of the princf les of exdsting social movement dietorical theory has afforded 
the movement success w&ere others have fidled.
The study examines the rhetoric of the movement as exemplified by the work of 
Reed, Robertson and other leaders as well as information published by the Christian 
Coalition to exqplain and defend the movement’s stance on significant issues. The study 
win conf are language used in earty worits with more current publications to show a shift 
in rhetorical strategy that hetyed ease the transition between the last two phases of the 
movement’s life cycle. The Maintenance Stage should be a time of decline or at least a
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time ofholding on d e f  eratety to retain membershf. The bureaucratic necessities 
involved in fimd raising, organization, and intergroif negotiation consume the energy of 
the movement’s leaders and dampen the excitement and f  ontaneity that attracted 
followers during earlier stages (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989). An examination of 
the metaphors applied and themes addressed will show how New Christian Right leaders 
in the Christian Coalition have manipulated the language of the Religious Right in an 
attempt to appeal to a broader audience and how that strategy has contributed to the 
movement’s growth.
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CHAPTER4
ANALYSIS
Genesis; Where do we begin?
Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1989) state that any effort to develop a generalizable 
description of the life cycle of social movements is “fraught with dangers” (p. 21.) but that 
the effort can be rewarding if the scholar proceeds with the understanding that social 
movements change and develop at varying feeds and degrees, “stalling at times, rushing 
forward at others, retrenching to earlier stages, or dying premature deaths before all stages 
are completed.” The authors show that social movements have a tendency to be absorbed 
or transformed into another movement before the final curtain is drawn (Stewart, Smith, 
and Denton, 1989). These Actors can make it difficult to pinpoint the exact moment a 
social movement is bom and to tell the genesis of a new movement from a new 
manifestation of an old one.
Examining the evohrtion of the conservative religious movement presents an 
interesting example of all of the problems foced when identifying the genesis of a social 
movement. It could be argued that the genesis of the Religious Right began with the 
crucifixion almost 2,000 years ago or maybe with the arrival of the fimdamentalist 
movement in the earfy 1900s. Ceitainfy the seeds of discontent needed to stimulate the
42
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movement’s growth were planted long ago whh the Protestant world view that so strongly 
influenced the national culture.
Sociologists Ral^h Turner and Lewis Killian define a social movement as “a 
collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or 
group ofiA*ich it is a part” (Bruce, 1988, p. I). Another, even broader, definition is 
ofifered by SiHars who defines a movement as a combination of events i^ Aich can be linked 
in such a way that the critic can argue an effective case for treating them as one unit. The 
author then broadens the definition even further by saying, ^What makes a movement is 
that someone observes that it exists” (SiDars, 1980).
This study examines the social movement known as the “New Christian Right” 
and identifies its Genesis Mmse as that time of social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s 
v\hen religious conservatives began feeling out of place in their own country. Stewart, 
Smith, and Denton say a social movement usually begins when there is little public 
attention being paid to the issues the movement will address (1989). That would serve as 
an apt descr^tion of the liberal 1960s and 1970s with regard to religious conservative 
issues. During the genesis stage, restless individuals become aware of the problem or 
perceived in^ierfection and strive to spread the word of the dangers (Stewart, Smith, and 
Denton, 1989). Evangelicals saw the changes in social structures and a rise in the 
influence of liberalism as a threat to the conservative rdigious ideology. Civil Rights 
rulings firom the Siqrreme Court threatened the Religious Right’s ability to dictate how 
and with whom their children would be educated (Brace, 1988) and the Roe Vs. Wade 
ruling legalizing abortion planted the seeds firr the Right to Life Movement that would
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later serve as the original power base for the Religions R i^ t (lost, 1994).
Here, the Religious Right enjoyed a communication benefit rarely seen in 
opposition movements. The earfy “prophets” of the Religious Right movement can be 
identified as the televangelists who enjoyed a huge growth in popularity during the genesis 
stage of the movement giving these prophets a massive audience and lending legitimacy to 
the movement in its early days. The television ministries and evangelical churches which 
were enjoying nmsave growth during the 1960s and 1970s provided a communication 
network and an autonutic foeling of community These early leaders enjoyed an ultimate 
form of legitimacy in the eyes of their followers who had already come to accept the 
‘prophets” as messengers of God’s word.
Social Unrest Stage
A triggering event is needed to propel a movement firom the Genesis Stage to the 
Social Unrest Stage, according to Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1989). The event that 
triggered the flowering o f the New Christian Right can be identified as the moment the 
triumvirate of Richard \^guerie, Howard Phiflq»s and Paul W onch combined forces with 
televangelist Jerry Falwell to form the Moral Majority. This combining of forces can be 
identified as the moment the diverse individuals, who had previous^ been woridng and 
speaking individual^, came together to egress their dissatisfiiction (Steward, Smith, and 
Denton, 1989). The new organization gave the Religious Right a point of focus for their 
disaffection and propelled the movement into the next phase.
The Moral Majority caused the mass media to take notice of the movement as
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Stewart, Smith, and Denton prescribe (1989). The results of the groiq>’s fond raising and 
letter writing carr^aigns nude it inçossible to ignore. It was during the Falwell era that 
the evil o f“Human Secularism” began to take a prominent place in the rhetoric of the 
Religious Right helping to further the “we-they” distmctions that gave the movement its 
identity and setup the Godless liberals as the enemy. At this point, in keeping with the life 
cycle theory, the movement was atten^ting, with some success, to promote its agenda 
within the system working to block the Equal Rights Amendment, lobbying against 
legalized abortion, and supporting the election o f‘^ ght thinking” leaders such as Ronald 
Reagan (Bruce, 1988).
Falwell used his high-profile position as television minister to promote Christian 
Right messages and gatvanize the Moral Majority into a social movement by dramatizing 
the evils of Hunun Secularism and urging followers to rise up against the forces of Satan 
(Appel, 1987).
Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage 
“When fiustration leads to disaffection with institutions and their ability to change, 
the social movement arters the stage o f‘Enthusiastic Mobilization,’ ” Stewart, Smith, and 
Denton state ( 1989, p. 25). The Religious Right suffered that fiustration under Ronald 
Reagan when his administration fidled to address abortion, school prayer, and other issues 
inq)ortant to the cause.
The Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage is populated with true believers who are tired 
of wtahing for reform from within the system and believe foe movement is foe only way to
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bring about urgently needed changes. The leaders see thenaselves as both right and havmg 
power on their sides (Stewart, Smhh, and Denton, 1989). Robertson believed his 
legitimacy and power came from the ultimate source and saw his candidacy as bemg 
anointed by God. He developed a compelling narrative to convince his followers that God 
had given him a sign that verified his calling into politics. Robertson said he “put out a 
fleece” just as Gideon of the Old Testament did to test a message from God that instructed 
Gideon lead Israel into battle. Gideon asked for confirmation by a sign — a wet fleece on 
dry ground or a dry fleece on wet ground — to prove the message was real Robertson’s 
fleece was a hurricane that threatened the coast of^rginia. Robertson describes the 
event: “At 9:15 I kneh on the floor of my small dressing room and poured ngr heart out to 
the Lord. ‘Father,’ I said, ‘H I can’t  move the storm, how can I move a nation? Father, I 
am laying a fleece before You. H this storm hits our area, I am out of the presidential 
race completely ” (Hertzke, 1993, p. 19). At 4 am., Robertson woke to find the 
hurricane had veered away from the region before hitting land and decided God had given 
the stamp of approval for his presidential run (Hertzke, 1993).
To Robertson, his canpaign was a movement of outsiders trying to “knock down 
the doors of power” and he expressed the common populist conplaint that the Religious 
Right was kept at the perphery of cultural and economic life (Hertzke, 1993, p. 118). 
Robertson believed evil cultural traids were caused by a grand conpiracy that included 
communists, occult religions, and captains of wealth. He painted a dark picture of 
exploited children, poor schools, fractured femilies and a rocky economy caused by an evil 
plot (Robertson, 1991a).
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Robertson’s theories on high finance bordered on paranoia with viâons of secret 
cabals and behind-the-scenes sinister marrpulation. “The money barons are getting much 
closer to control of the world’s econonqr than even they may have believed possible. . .  
Consider what would then happen if in a Trilateral worid, the central bank of Europe, the 
central bank of Japan, and the central bank of the United States began to coordinate their 
efforts, or even to merge. If that happened, some twenty-one people, possible as few as 
three people, could control the money and credit of essentially the attire world” 
(Robertson, 1991a, p. 130-131).
in Robertson’s view, this powerful financial elite is an eneotyto the common 
businessman;
The power is subtle but incredibly intense, hi high finance, all it takes is a quiet 
word firom the right person to destroy the future of any public company that is 
carrying substantial debt. . .  The coup de grace is always administered in a 
paneled, deeply carpeted environment in the most goiteel of tomes. ‘Tm sorry, 
but our loan committee does not believe that this is a bankable proposition. . .  Our 
loan committee has voted not to renew your conpany’s annual fine” (Robertson, 
1991a, p. 136).
One of the rhetorical requirements of movement leaders, according to Simons 
( 1970), is to secure adoption of their product by the larger structure. Robertson’s views 
on economic issues had the oppoate effect and caused conflict with the fi'ee-market 
enthusiasts in the Republican Party. He advocated boycotts to force advertisers in line and 
fovored regulating television content. He attacked financial dites for stock manpulation, 
blatant greed, and corruption (Hertzke, 1993). Statements such as the following did not 
win Robertson fiiards in the ipper echelons of the Republican party:
Unbridled capitalism must be restrained or people will get too much money and
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too nmch power and will use it to oppress others. . .  Just as the coercive 
utopianism of Communist materialism is not of God, neither is a capitalist 
materialism — based on the amasang of ridies for personal gain, with disregard for 
the afOictions of the needy—right (Hertzke, 1993. p. 106).
Robertson’s conspirators in the sinister plot to control the world included the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Federal Reserve Board, the State Department, the
Trilateral Conunission, and New Age Religion. He saw tymbols of the conpiracy in
Masonic rituals, and occult signs on the dollar biR He also saw in Bush’s New World
Order, a one-world occult conpiracy right out ofReveladons (Robertson, 1991a). The
one-world conpiracy theory can be traced back 200 years and involves a conpiracy to
bring the destruction of national sovereignty, abolition of private property, and the
elimination of Christian theism (Hertzke, 1993). “The new world order wiU have as its
religion a god o f light, whom Bible scholars recognize as Lucifor. Nations who walk in
Lucifer’s way will find onty suffering and heartache, but never peace!” (Robertson,
1991a).
Robertson’s plan for dealing with ^ la t he saw as inpending financial collpse was 
a “Year of Jubilee” as mentioned in the Old Testament Book of Leviticus. It is not known 
if the program was ever instituted but the “Year of Jubilee” was a 50-year cycle in Israel in 
which all debts were to be canceled. As earty as 1981, Robertson touted the idea of a 
constitutional amendment dictating periodic debt relief claiming debt reduction would 
soon come anyway in the form of financial collapse so the government might as well 
reduce debt in an o rde^  foshion (Hertzke, 1993).
Bruce points out foat Robertson’s conpiracy theory may seem strange to those
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outside the movement but that secret cabals and global plots would seem quite reasonable 
to religious people vfoo believe there is a hidden order to the world, a purpose to history, 
and that Satan is real (Bruce, 1988).
Robertson tended to confuse his personal agenda with God’s plan and often 
confused prophet with prediction. He predicted a stock market crash that never 
occurred and predicted the Soviet Union would lead an army against Israel based on 
prophecy in Revelation. His rhetoric could be conpeDing as when he was chastising a 
doctor who performed third-trimester abortions or as outlandish as when he linked liberals 
with Satan and feminists with witchcraft (Hertzke, 1993).
Robertson compared his campaign to an epic struggle between good and evfl. On 
Easter Sunday, 1988, on the eve of the Colorado caucuses, Robertson delivered a similar 
message at four evangehcal churches: Tt looks like the bad guys are winning in this 
country, but so did it look that way on Good Friday. . .  It looked as if Satan had beaten 
Jesus that day” (Hertzke, 1993, p. 1). Just as Jesus Christ rose from the dead, so would 
moral Americans eventual^ prevail
Advocating what he called “natural law,” Robertson saw the His of modem society 
such as AIDS, the decaying femity, poor education, and an eroding economy as inevitable 
consequences violating that law. “Well, people in this country are violating certain moral 
laws and standards and as a result, thty’re getting diseases,” he said. When you “sew 
moral decadence ” you “reap the wAirlwind ” (Hertzke, 1993, p. 97). “Human cruelty, 
human selfishness, drug addiction, and sexual promiscuity wiU always bring poverty and 
disintegration of society” (Hertzke, 1993 p. 87).
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The New Christian Right, as manifested by the Robertson campaign, was 
beginning to serve as a surrogate third party. Thouÿi Robertson feHed to receive enough 
support to arrive at the national convention as a serious contender, his organization 
continued to work to make sure his followers were well represented (Bruce, 1988). They 
depicted their struggle for representation at the convention as “Lhristiaiis versus 
Republicans," equating party regulars as persecuting Romans and they saw themselves as 
a separate entity. “At our state convention, we had quite a few Christians there, hi feet, 
we outnumbered the RpubHcans," Coalition leader Marlene EtweH said (Hertzke, 1993, 
p. 159).
The Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage of a social movement often adneves some 
significant goals and victories but a vision of sweeping change and instant success eludes 
the movement causing a loss of hope in the cause and a feding of enthusiasm (Stewart, 
Smith, and Denton, 1989). The successes of the Robertson campaign were certainly 
significant. Not onty did the canpaign succeed in raising a large war chest, capturing 
many primary caucuses, and injecting Religious Rig^t issues into the Rpubhcan platform, 
h also educated many followers on effective grassroots canpaign techniques. However, 
the ultimate feihire of the canpaign to win the Republican nomination demonstrates the 
end of the illusions and the feding of enthusiasm. The fiühire of the canpaign may be 
traced to a feihire to find a rhetorical strategy that would make the goals of the movement 
palatable to a mass audience but the canpaign did accomplish the task of “giving structure 
to anxiety and a tangible target for hostility" and fostering group feelings (Simons, 1970, 
p. 5).
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At the end of the long, hard-fought struggle, George Bush was the new president 
and it was evident that the causes so dear to the Religious Right would continue to receive 
the Ip service so liberal^ applied under Reagan. At this stage, the movement feced the 
problem o f ‘^ seudosupporative reactions" from an administration that was “too kind" to 
the group (Simons, 1970) bringmg the possibility of fragmentation. Robertson addressed 
these problems with the formation of the Christian Coalition and propelled the movement 
into the next stage of the life cycle (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989).
Christian Coalition as “Maintenance Stage”
The onset of the “Maintenance Stage" is a critical time for a social movement and, 
as the struggle is prolonged, the odds are against victory because frustration wiU lead to 
disillusionment (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1989). Few social movements are totalty 
successful and many are absorbed or coopted by established institutions. So for, the 
Religious Right and the Christian Coalition have defied this prediction. Reed claims that 
Christian Coalition membership eploded in earty 1993 as a backlash to Bill Clinton’s 
election and by 1994, the groip was adding 10,000 new members each week (Reed,
1994). The Coalition now boasts 1.8 million active supporters (Neibuhr, 1996a), operates 
on a $25 million annual budget and, in 1996, wielded considoable influence over the 
Republican National Convention (Bimbaum, 1995).
Reed and his Coalition have combined old-foshioned grass-roots political 
organization with up-to-the-minute technology and communications techniques with 
astounding success (Lawton, 1992). In a marked departure from Stewart, Smith and
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Denton’s model, (1989) the groiqt does not depend on tndMonal media outlets to 
transmit messages to its audience, in foct, the Coalition activety avoids mainstream media 
attention and reaches supporters through cable television religious programs and 
alternative media including direct mail, phone trees, and satellite interactive TV (Conason, 
1993).
hr his book. Politically Incorrect. Reed brags about the effectiveness of avoiding 
the mainstream press. ‘The genius of the Christian Coalition was its emphasis on the 
grassroots and its avoidance of a star-studded Washmgton media event or rally that 
announced lofty goals and attracted media attention” (Reed, 1994). He points to the value 
of fox networks and phone trees and describes how a Christian Coalition foction in 
Houston assembled a computerized phone tree that enabled them to reach 4,000 
households in a matter of hours (Reed, 1994).
He claims ahemative electronic media are now encroaching on the power of the 
mainstream press. ‘Talk radio and cable TV, dominated by conservative voices like Rush 
Limbaugh and Pat Robertson, now rivals or eclipses the establishment press in shaping the 
nations political agenda,” he said (Reed, 1994, p. 159).
The group’s most successful communication tactics consist primarily of two 
programs; the Voter Identification program and the Voter Guide program. The success of 
the Voter Identification plan relies on general voter apathy in local elections where a small 
turnout is expected (Bringing in the votes, 1992). In these races, volunteers call into a 
preselected precinct and claim to be taking an infi>rmal survey for the Christian Coalition. 
In the 1992 election in Virginia, for exanple, the survey consisted of four questions: “Did
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
you vote for Dukakis or Bush? Are you a Repubfican or a Democrat?” If  the refondent 
answered, “Dukakis, Democrat” the survey was ended. “We didn’t even write them 
down,” Reed said, “We don’t want to connnunicate whh them. We don’t  even want them 
to know there is an election gomg on.” The next question, for those who remained in the 
survey, was “Do you fovor restrictions on abortion?” and finalty, “What is the most 
important issue focing your community? ” (Claritson, 1992a, p. 5).
From the results of the survey, the Coalition created a database with survey 
answers coded according to the voter’s issue burdens. Voters would soon receive a letter, 
individually tailored to that person’s issue burden, from the Coalition candidate. If the 
voter happened to be pro-choice, the letter would not mention abortion. T ’Q take the 
votes of the pro-abortion Republicans to get anti-abortion Republicans voted in,” Reed 
said (Clarkson, 1992a, p. 5). In 1993, the Voter Identification Program amassed a 
computerized file of 1.6 million constituents (Siberi, 1993). Simons (1970) said 
movement leaders must adapt to several audiences simuhaneousty because, in an age of 
mass media, messages addressed to one audience were likety to reach many. It is doubtful 
Simons ever envisioned technology so sophisticated it would allow coimmmication that 
was tailored ^ecificaHy to individual audience members and delivered by media that 
circumvented mass transmission.
The Coalition’s Voter Guides is another highty successfiil strategy that also 
circumvents the disadvantages of traditional mass communication. In this program, 
publications Reed claims are “strictly nonpartisan and endorsed no candidates” (Reed, 
1994, p. 8), conpare candidates’ views or records on issues seen as inportant by the
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Coafition. These “guides” are distributed in churches on the Sunday before key elections 
along with a cover letter signed by Robertson and others, asking diurch leaders to: 
‘provide your members with noipartisan knowledge they need to proper as citizens.”
The %er assures readers that the Christian Coalition is a “hoiprofit organization that is 
not afBliated with any political party and does not endorse candidates” (Claikson, 1992b,
p. 6).
As an exanple of the Voter Guide Program in action, the Christian Coalition of 
Florida distributed 1.5 million guides to 4,000 selected churches in a 1990 campaign and 
obtained church membership lists and cross-reforenced them against lists of registered 
Republicans in a voter identification project (Clarkson, 1992a). in the 1990 Senate race 
in North Carolina, the Coalition came to Sen. Jesse Hehn’s rescue by inserting voter 
guides into church bulletins on the Sunday before the election. Hehns had been eight 
points behind before the Coalition kicked into action but won by 100,000 votes out of 2.2 
million cast. “The press had no idea what we were doing,” said Christian Coalition 
Southern Regional Director Judy Haynes, “And they stiU don’t know vriiat we did, but it 
worked” (Clarkson, 1992a, p. 5).
A blanket of Coalition voters guides usually resuhs in the election of Republicans. 
The guides were seen as a foctor in the defeat of Democrat Wyche Flower in Georgia and 
the unseating of Democratic (Sovemor Terry Sanford in North Carolina in 1992 
(Clarkson, 1992a). A recent anatysis o f the Coalition’s Voter Guides for the 1996 
elections by the People for the American Way, a group that advocates separation of 
church and state and opposes the Christian Coalition, found the information in the guides
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distorted Demomtic candidates’ views and that the information often did not come from 
the candidates but was sippfied by the Coalition. For exanple, wdule candidates were 
asked if thty fovored repealing the semi-automatic weapons ban, the voter guides 
substituted the word “firearms^ ’ for “semi-automatic weapons” making it appear the 
candidates fovored a ban on an gun ownershp. The study found that voter guides 
distributed in several states indicate President Clinton opposes a ban on late-term 
abortions when the president fovors a ban that includes a meaningful exception to protect 
the lifo or health of the mother. The guides do not say that the president did not reply to 
the Coalition’s questionnaire and that the grotp sippfied the answers (People for the 
American Way, 1996). A few days before the 1996 election. President Clinton’s 
canpaign launched a television ad to combat a last-minute flood of 46 million Voter 
Guides the Coalition claims were distributed in 125,000 churches throughout the nation 
(Kurtz, 1996). The bulk of the guides, one for every three registered voters, were handed 
out at church doors, placed on pews or stapled inside church bulletins (Goodstein, 1996b.) 
The Coalition’s tactics include distributing the Voter Guides on the Sunday before an 
election giving candidates little time to correct misinformation (People for the American 
Way, 1996).
Using these tactics, the group did well with anti-homosexual measures in 
Colorado and Oregon and defeated equal-rights for women laws in Iowa. With the 
Coalition providing bdiind-the-scenes support, the Washington Republican Party in 1992 
adopted a platform that banned abortion, sippotted teadiing creationism in schools, 
reclaiming the Panama Canal and putting America back on the Gold Standard (The godly
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right, 1992). MobiHzmg grass roots sippoit through sophisticated marketing on radio and 
television, print advertisement, video tape distribution, advanced conputer systems, phone 
banks, leaflets and direct mail make up what is known as “the air war” (Siberi, 1993).
hi the last few years, the Christian Coalition has ipdated its use of the latest 
communications technology in the “air war.” The group has formed links with Weyrich to 
develop an interactive television network called National Enpowerment Television 
(NET). NET is a closed-circuit satellite system (Clarkson, 1992b) which allows leaders to 
talk directfy with grassroots activists via satellite hooktp. Allies across the country meet 
at a chosen site and a nearby satellite dish beams Washington figures into the room for a 
live conversation. W ^rich’s group. Free Congress, used the system to inundate Senate 
offices with pro-Clarence Thomas telephone calls during the confirmation hearings. The 
Coalition has also purchased sophisticated conputer soflware that combines voter 
registration information with census data, addresses and phone listings (Conn, 1993a).
These methods have proved highly successfiil in low-tumout, local elections. 
Evangelicals made the winning difference in November 1993 when Virginians elected a 
Republican governor, George Allen, for the first time in 16 years. Allen’s election he^ed 
dipel the theory that the Religious Right was a liability to the Republican Party (O’Keefe, 
1993).
In 1993, the Coalition’s Voter Guides played an inportant part in a coordinated 
effort with the Catholic Archdiocese of New York to take over the city’s schools.
Cardinal John J. O’Cormor and the Roman Catholic Diocese of New York distributed 
thousands of Voter Guides in 213 parishes after school Chancellor Joseph A  Fernandez
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alienated religious conservatives by advocating condom distribution in high school as part 
of an AIDS prevention program (Woodward and Rogers, 1993). Fernandez fiirther 
foeled the flame by promoting the “Children of the Rainbow” curriculum that celebrated 
racial and ethnic diversity and encouraged tolerance o f homosexuals (AAdrowitz, 1993). 
The controversy brought an end to the chancellor’s employment and brought on a heated 
canpaign for control of the city’s schools (Conn, 1993b). Uhimatety, the Religious 
Right’s organizing in New Yoric backfired. The opposition, which Reed labeled “gay 
activists and former anti-Vietnam war protesters, ” (Reed, 1994, p. 9) organized a counter 
canpaign. As a result there is evidence that homosexuals voted in higher numbers than in 
any previous election and openty gay candidates won in two districts (Religious 
bedfellows, 1993). However, fiom this experience, the Coalition found that conservative 
Catholics and evangelicals had common ground on abortion, homosexuality, private 
school vouchers, and control of public schools (Conn, 1993b).
Transition
The Coalition’s astounding success in the 1994 elections and its continued growth 
and power in the Republican party can be directty attributed to a carefiilly calculated 
change in rhetorical strategy that coincides with a transition between the “Enthusiastic 
Mobilization” stage to the “Maintenance ” stage (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1989). La 
this process, Reed has evolved from the group’s ‘^ bble rouser” into the 
“statesman/dplomat’’ Stewart, Smith and Denton prescribe for the Maintoumce Stage. 
Before 1993, Reed was known to brag about the group’s “Stealth Politics” and was
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widely quoted uamg war and military metaphors when describing the group’s political 
tactics. In 1992, Reed told the Orange County Register (March 9.19921 that the 
Coalition was “moving from a very visible, very vulnerable strategr to an underground 
strategy, to a stealth strategy. You wouldn’t know wAat’s gomg on because it doesn’t 
show up on a radar screen” (Clarkson, 1992b, p. 5).
T  want to be invisible. I do guerilla warfrue. I paint ny  free and travel at night 
You don’t know it’s over until you’re m a body bag. You don’t know until election 
night, ” was one o f Reed’s more widely quoted remarks (Claikson, 1992b). Reed also 
talked of “Shimmying along on our bellies,” to get votes (“The godty right,” 1992) and 
“%ing below radar” (Conason, 1992).
Reed said the Coalition travels “under the cover of night, where every moment you 
disguise your position and your truth from the eneny, because the minute you stick your 
head up, you can be shot” (Siberi, 1993, p. 782). He boasted of winning a majority of 
seats on the GOP central Committee in one Cahfrimia county but declined to say which 
one. “The county and the liberals and the media won’t know it until th^r take their seats 
and prove themselves to be what you would call Christian-right people” (Siberi, 1993, p. 
782).
“We’ve learned how to move under the radar in the cover of the night with 
shrubbery strapped to our helmets,” Reed told Newsday. T t’s like being a good 
submarine captain; you come up, fire three missiles and then dive ” (Clarkson, 1992b, p. 5).
Other Coalition leaders were heard using war metaphors but in a more defensive 
mode such as Gary Bauer who declared nothing less than a “Civil War” over American
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cultuie. T  find a lot ofpeopie who feel under siege. Their perception is that thty’re 
living in a hostile country, that everything thqr believe is under persistent attack”
(Hertzke, 1993 p. 114).
By 1993, Reed was trying to back-peddle on the war dietoric. “The stealth thing 
is bad for the movement. It isn’t the fiiture. It’s the past, if anything,” he said (Barrett, 
1993 p. 60). Later he claimed the media had exaggerated and misquoted him. “Some 
have inaccurately charged that religious conservatives hide their religious affiliation by 
conducting stealth campaigns” (Reed, 1994, p. 37).
In a réponse to a publication by the Anti-Defomation League, the Christian 
Coalition denied that the organization ever particqrated in “stealth” politics and denies that 
Reed ever admitted they did. The ADL is obsessed with the notion that Christian 
conservatives engaged in so-called stealth’ activities. . .  It fidsefy claims that the 
Coalition ‘acknowledges having used (stealth tactics)’” (Canpaign of fidsehoods, 1994, p. 
9). The publication goes on to deny that the Coalition had any part in a weH-pubhcized 
“stealth” canpaign in San Diego in 1990 and says the Coalition ‘heither practices nor 
endorses the ‘stealth tactics’ the ADL claims ” (Canqiaign of fidsdioods, 1994, p. 9-10). 
The publication quotes Reed’s new book:
We do not advocate electing officials by depressing voter turnout or taking 
advantage of historicalty low voter particÿation. Some have inaccurately charged 
that religious conservatives hide their religious affiliation, conducting “stealth” 
campaigns in which they eschew public forums and canqxaign exchiavety in 
churches. The opposite is true. . .  Pro-fomdy candidates win at the ballot box 
because of their viewrs, not in ^ ite  of them (Campaign of folsdioods, 1994, p. 12).
Soon, the war metaphors were replaced with qtotts metaphors like the language
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from Pofidca% Incorrect (Reed, 1994); “hi ^ o its, if the defoisive team is preventing the 
ground game, the offense should pass the ball Likewise, in politics there is nothing wrong 
and everything prudent in changing the game plan at halfrime if necessary to win. The key 
is not to become wedded to the play book but to win the game. Tactical intransigence 
hamstrings the effectiveness of social movements” (Reed, 1994, p. 224). T  think the jump 
ball of the 1996 presidential election is the Catholic vote,” Reed said to the Detroit News 
(Stevens, 1996).
Reed also began backing down fromtriunqxhant talk, denying his group wanted to 
take control of any party and talking about inclusion. ” On “Meet the Press” in November 
1992 he said, “We’d like to see a time when both parties are inclusive of our agenda and 
our constituents” (The godty right, 1992).
In qiite of inclusive” rhetoric, the movement remains over^ehningly white, a 
backlash from the Religious Right’s lack of involvement in the Civil Rights Movement 
(Lawton, 1992). To gain some statistical legitimacy for his new inclusive” canqxaign, 
Reed commissioned a national poll of minority churchgoers hoping to find a constituency 
among minorities and in 1993 announced figures showing that, on some social issues, 
devout blacks, Hi^anics and Asians Anmicans tyuqxathize with religious-right views 
(Barrett, 1993). The Coalition woriced activety in South Carolina to recruit blacks and 
other minorities but attenqits to broaden their minority support have not been highty 
successfiil (Pat Robertson calls, 1994).
According to Simons, the leader of a social movement must “constant^ balance 
inherently conflicting demands” (1970, p. 4). Reed freed the rhetorical dilemma of trying
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to maintain the established power base enjoyed by the Religions Right while broadenmg 
the movement to mchide other groups. Ih Juty 1993, Reed held a Washington press 
conference to announce plans to move b^ond abortion and homosmmahty and exqiand 
into economics, taxes and other pocketbook issues with greater appeal to the general 
public (Conn, 1993d). At the press confermce, he said the shift was purred by a poH 
conducted among churdigoing voters shortly after the 1992 presidential campaign. T o  
our surprise, their top five issues were the same as everybody else’s - the economy and 
jobs, welfere, the budget deficit and crime. Abortion ranked eighth as an issue and gay 
rights twelfth or thirteenth” (Conn, 1993d, p. 14). Reed said the Coalition would remain 
active in its opposition to legal abortion and gay rights and in support of school prayer but 
economic concerns would receive increased attention along with private school vouchers, 
welfere reform and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Christian Coalition shifts 
tactics, 1993).
This new theme was repeated in several qxeeches and articles in wAich Reed 
advocated what he called “casting a wider net” and represents Reed’s attempt to “balance 
inherent^ conflicting demands on his position and on the movement he represents” as 
prescribed by Simons (1970, p. 4). The Christian Coalition “has not yet completely 
connected its agenda with average voters. The pro-fimnty movement still has limited 
appeal,” Reed said. He said the movement is ‘policy-thin and value-laden” leaving many 
voters tuned out. The movement needs to promote policies that provide personal benefits. 
“The pro-femity activists have built their movement around personalities rather than 
policies. But their personal charisma, wMe an inportant asset, is no substitute for good
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policy,” he said. The movement must “develop a broader issues agenda. . .  must speak 
to the concerns of average voters in the areas of taxes, crime, government waste, health 
care and financial security” (Reed, 1993b, p. 311). Reed admitted that networit mdt polls 
in 1992 showed, “onty 12 percent o f voters indicated that abortion was a key issue in their 
voting deciaon,” and only 22 percent of evangelicals listed abortion as an important 
voting issue (Reed, 1993b, p. 312). At this point, Reed began to represent a new kind of 
leader for the movement, one Simons identifies as a “moderate.” “Dressed in the garb of 
repectability and exhibiting Ivy League earnestness and Nfidwestem diarm, the moderate 
gets angry but does not shout, issues pamphlets but never manifestos, inveighs against 
social mores but always in the value language of the social order” (Simons, 1970, p. 7).
To fiirther the image of inclusion and non-partisanshp, Reed persuaded David 
WOhelm, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, to be the token liberal among 
dozens of conservative peakers at the Road to Victory conference in 1993. To counter a 
conpiratorial image, for the first time, the conference was held in Washington rather than 
Virginia Beach and was pardalty open to the press (Barrett, 1993). The strategy backfired 
wfoen Wilhehn used the opportunity to denounce the groip’s tactics. “When you call 
yourselves the ‘Christian Coalition’ and savagety attack members o f Congress for their 
point of view, inplicit in that attack is the message that those who disagree may have 
taken an un-Christian position.” Wlhehn’s statements on a liberal stance on abortion and 
homosexuality were met with catcalls, groans and derisive laughter ^ n d i belied Reed’s 
call to widen the group’s issue focus (Conn, 1993a).
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Persuasive Feats of Magic 
According to Stewart, Smith and Denton, ‘Tersuaave feats of magic are required 
to keep coalitions intact for extended periods” (1989 p. 27). Reed and other Coalition 
leaders have been required to pull many a dietorical rabbit out of their hats wMe working 
to transform the movement without becoming tangled in the “wider net.”
In an effort to move btyond the issues of abortion and homosexuality and to 
counteract an image of moral superiority, Reed changed his message to illustrate that the 
primary interest of evangelicals is ‘hot to legislate against the sins of others, but to protect 
the health, welfere, and financial security of their own femilies. The issue that most united 
evangelicals and fiscal conservatives was the deficit” (Reed, 1993, p. 312). On “Good 
Morning America” Reed defended his Voter Guides saying thty show where candidates 
stand on such issues as a balanced budget amendment, term limits, lower taxes and 
tougher laws against crime and drugs. “We are not attenqxting to legislate our theology. 
We are trying to legislate our public policy views,” he said (Jost, 1994, p. 894).
One of the rhetorical tactics Reed uses often comes directly from lessons he 
learned from Pat Robertson in presenting the Religious R i^ t as a persecuted minority.
He presents episodical evidence that Religious Right candidates are attacked and ridiculed 
for their beliefe as, for exanqxle, when an opposition candidate in South Carolina described 
the religious candidate’s leading qualification for office as “Handling snakes and being able 
to speak fluently in tongues” (Reed, 1994). People of feith want to exercise their rights 
like anyone else, “but their religion makes them suqrect, and a deep and abiding (distmst) 
often disqualifies them ” (Reed, 1994). The prejudice against religious conservatives, Reed
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states, goes back to the Scopes Trial when HX. Menken’s scathing desciÿtions of the 
religions conservatives involved m the trial fostered a prejudice still feh today. As a result, 
the Religious R i ^  is the new “Amos and Andy” of society, a caricature that reinforces 
our culture’s phobia against religion (Reed, 1994).
Reed claims that separation of church and state doctrine has replaced “Freedom of 
religion ” with “freedom from rdigjon” and comnumicates a message that religion is 
offensive and should be kept out of public view. The political activian of the Religious 
Right is merely an attempt to allow people of fidth to enter the public square after they 
have “qient the last half century with their noses pressed against the glass of culture” 
(Reed, 1994, p. 26). These themes are also seen in Robertson’s rhetoric (Robertson, 
1991a, 1991b).
During a leadershqi conference in Charleston, S C. in July 1993, Reed called on 
activists to tone down dietoric on abortion and gay rights and begin focuang on broader 
issues. During the conference. National Held Director Guy Rogers urged activists to 
drop the language of “sanctification,” ‘healing,” and “baptism of the spirit” that even 
Southern Baptists found urmmving (Hertzke, 1993, p. 169). “Don’t talk about 
reconciling the world to God or ushering in the kingdom of Christ,” he said. He advised 
the crowd not to tell the public, “We’re in this to tear down the kingdom of Lucifer and 
exah the throne o f Christ” (Conn, 1993d, p. 14). “When tactics become ends in 
themselves, however, social movements feher. . .  The cluster of pro-femily issues must 
now be exqianded to attract a majority of voters,” Reed said (1993b, p. 311).
To aid this expansion, Reed has made a conscious effort to appeal to minorities
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and women saying the Coalition “must build a genumety inclusive movement that 
embraces the full racial diversity of America, and makes room for our black, brown, and 
yellow brothers and sisters in Christ” (Reed, 1994, p. 239). His speeches and writings 
often attençt to form bonds whh Afiican-Americans, Ifiqianics and women. Former 
Education Secretary William Bennet starts his introduction to Reed’s 1994 book with a 
salute to Martin Luther King and references to King are found throughout the work 
(Reed, 1994). Reed said among the universal truths government adopted from religion is 
the tenant that “blacks and whites are equal because God created them in his image ” 
(Reed, 1994, p. 12). He cited a poll by Democrat Peter Hart that showed 87 percent of 
young blacks ranked the femHy as their most important concern in life and the 1993 
Christian Coalition poll found that minorities tend to be more religious than whites with 63 
percent of African-Americans and 43 percent of Ifiqtanics identifying themselves as “bom 
again.” More African-Americans and Hiqianics than whites say th^r pray every day, 
according to Reed. To demonstrate his synqiathy with minority causes, he points out that 
murder is the leading cause o f death for African-American males age 18 to 34 and said, “A 
minority adolescent in Washington, DC. has a better chance of being killed than a soldier 
in Vietnam” (Reed, 1994 p. 12). “They [blacks and Ifi^anics] oppose the legalization of 
drugs, support the death penalty, and object to the teaching of homosexuality as an 
acceptable hfestjie in public schools” (Reed, 1994, p. 241).
Reed denies any historical connection between the Ku Khix Klan and the pro- 
femily movement while admitting that the current rhetoric sounds hauntingfy fenriliar He 
draws a cormection between current-day religious political activists and the ‘pastoral
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leaders who tran^orted supporters to protests in church buses,” in Atlanta during the civil 
right movement (Reed, 1994, p. 241). However, he also admits, details, and laments the 
Southern clergy’s s i^ o rt for segregation and notes that although blacks agree with the 
Religious Right’s views, they refose to identify themselves as either Republican or 
conservative. Reed advocates increased activism in the Democratic party as a way to 
reach minorities (Reed, 1994).
Reed attempts to broaden the Coalition’s appeal to Catholics and Jews in his 
books and q>eeches. He appeals to Catholics through the causes of anti-abortion and 
private schools and said ‘hasty nativist and dark distrust about Popery and foreign 
influence have been swept away into the trash heap of history” (Reed, 1994, p. 96). He 
appeals to Jews by listing several Jewish leaders wdro have ^oken before Christian 
Coalition conventions and points to the Religious Right’s s i^ o rt of Israel as evidence of 
inchistveness (Reed, 1994). hr a qieech of reconciliation before the Anti-Deflmmtion 
League, Reed addressed “honestfy^  and finnkfy” the “undeniable and palpable su^idon — 
even fear — that divides the Christian community from many American Jews” (Reed, 
1995a). He admitted that religious conservatives have “at times” been insensitive to the 
experiences of the Jewish people and then assured the groi^ that the Christian Coalition 
does not advocate a national religiorL He said the Religious Right advocated the 
separation of church and state then he showed how governmental hostility toward religion 
affects evangelicals. Catholics and Jews. ‘Today we deny the very freedoms that your 
forbearers came to this rration to enjoy. . .  I believe together we can bridge the chasm that 
separates us and join hands together in a common crusade for the values and ideals that
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define us and sustain us as a nation” (Reed, 1995a).
In an appeal to women, Reed said, “Women should be fi*ee to pursue the career of 
their choice and rise as high as their talents will cany them. But they should not be forced 
to work sin^fy to conq>ensate for the huge dnmk of ftnrily income that currently goes to 
taxes” (Reed, 1994, p. 227-228). This language is in marked contrast to Robertson’s. A 
letter mailed to supporters in Iowa under Robertson’s signature said, “The feminist agenda 
is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist, antffemify political movement 
that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, 
destroy capitalism, and become lesbians” (Boston, 1996). In later publications, Robertson 
and Reed have worked to combat an image of being against women’s rights. According 
to a Christian Coalition publication, Robertson sr^o rts women’s rights. “Dr. Robertson 
is a strong advocate of the rights of women and supports equal pay for equal work for 
women performing the same tasks as men” (Ten ntyths, undated, p. 13).
Reed’s rhetoric on abortion has also softened in an atterrit to appeal to women. 
Instead of calling for laws against abottion, he claims the Coalition’s goal is to end 
taxpayer subsidies for abortions and to limit abortion to ‘ta rd  cases of rape incest and the 
life of the mother.” He cites a 1993 Galhqi poll to show strong support for his stance 
(Reed, 1994, p. 261). He claims the Religious Right seeks to “stop taxpayer subady, 
direct or indirect, and stop the qiread of abortion by allowing states to restrict it,” (Reed, 
1994, p. 260) and claims “70 percent (of American voters) oppose abortion on demand 
paid for by tax dollars” (Reed, 1994, p. 11). He paints abortion as a states’ rights issue 
saying, “While it is unlikefy that a majority of the states would do so (limit or restrict
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abortions) th^r should have that power (Reed, 1994, p. 260). Ihterestingty, when Reed 
talks about abortion he speaks of protecting ‘tnnocenf ’ human life, not all human life, 
because the Coalition sxqiports capital punishment (Reed, 1994, p. 254).
Reed’s solutions to the abortion debate include a sinqilistic stand on relaxing the 
adoption requirements. “Qnfy 370,000 children live in foster homes while more than 1 
million couples are seekmg to adopt," he said (Reed, 1994, p. 260). He said the 
“woman’s right to know” about the development o f the fetus is really about requiring that 
a woman be informed not about intimidation tactics (Reed, 1994, p. 260). In réponse to 
the new direction, even Robertson has moderated his language on the abortion issue and 
denies that opposition to abortion is a litmus test for receiving Christian Coalition support 
(Pat Robertson Calls, 1994).
Reed claimed it was the issue of education, not abortion, which gave rise to the 
New Religious Right “hi feet, the ^ark that ignited the modem pro-fem%r movemoit 
was the fear of increased government regulation of church schools. ” He said churchgoing 
voters strong^ support choice in education (Reed, 1993a). To avoid criticism that the 
Religious Right would abandon, and thereby destroy, the public school system, Reed 
minimizes talk about school vouchers and instead focuses on reforming the public school 
system to “restore parental rights and parental involvement,” (Reed, 1993a, p. 16). Reed 
no longer brags about taking over sdiool boards and packing them with religious 
conservatives but instead qieaks of‘Informing them (parmits) of how school boards work 
and ways of effectively communicating with elected officials (Reed, 1993a, p. 16). Of 
primary concern, Reed holds, is making schools safe from drugs and crime, not from
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religion (Reed, 1993a, 1994, 1995b).
The economy, according to Reed, is a fiunify issue and a cause of “middle class
anxiety” (Reed, 1994 p. 186).
Financial pressure on femOies must be addressed by the pro-femOy movement 
because it affects them as adversely as moral decay. Obviously the two fectors 
(financial issues and femify breakups) are intertwined. This suggests that the key 
to turning “femify values” into a policy ^ edfic message that wiH resonate with 
voters is to address the real needs of finmicia% pressed feanKes (Reed, 1994, p. 
225).
He advocated a 1994 GOP budget proposal that included a $500 per child tax 
credit that he claimed would transfer $103 billion fi:om government to femdies with 86 
percent going to families earning less then $75,000. He said the tax credit would have 
been paid for by cutting the Legal Services Corporation, the National Endowment for the 
Arts, and “consolidating social programs into block grants to the states.” The proposal 
foiled, he said, on a “straight party vote” (Reed, 1994, p. 228, 1993b).
Higher taxes have caused women to join the worirforce, Reed claims, as 
government “confiscates” two-thirds of a fiundy’s second income (Reed, 1994). ‘%gher 
taxes have tom at the fobric of the American family. .  Children are the main victims of 
this financial strain” (Reed, 1993b).
Reed says health care is also a financial burden on fiumBes and on the econonQr but 
he holds that the solution to the health care problem is healthier fiving. “Good Health 
reflects good living; poor health in many cases betrays poor living,” he said (Reed,
1993b). Of the $800 billion a year the United States qiends on health care, “many of the 
most expensive items in the health care budget are directly attributable to behavioral
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
problems.” He Hsted crack babies, drug abusers, hmg cancer patients, victims of drive-by 
shootings, domestic violence victims, and the sexua% promiscuous as the worst abusers 
of the health care system (Reed, 1993b, 1994). ‘Voor physiological health is often a 
reflection of psychological disorder,” he said (Reed, 1993b). Welfiue, in Reed’s view, is 
also a fondly, rather than an economic, issue. “Strengthening fomilies also means aiding 
the financial subsidies fi>r its breakup. Welfore r^ rm  must encourage woric, savings, 
marriage, and personal responsibility” (Reed, 1994, p. 259).
Censorship, to Reed is another fomOy issue but in Reed’s rhetoric, books are not 
banned; concerned parents merety seek to regulate dxildren’s access to unsuitable reading 
material He claims more censorshq* is practiced on the left than on the right when books 
are banned because of racial shirs (Reed, 1994). According to Reed, the Religious Right 
would like to see hard core pornography, not censured but, “stigmatized” and confined to 
“dirty old men” but he then goes on to laud an Oregon ballot initiative that would outlaw 
pornography (Reed, 1994, p. 29). The controversy over fimding for the National 
Endowment for the Arts, Reed holds, is about wasteful govemmait spending not about 
censorshq) (Reed, 1994, 1993b).
Getting Tangled in a Wider Net 
Reed’s broadened agenda exposed the Coalition to criticism from within, as 
Stewart, Smith and Denton predicted (1989). Simons (1970) said that within a 
movement, conflicts will develop over questions of value, strategy, tactics as purists clash 
with pragmatists over the benefits of compromise. This conflict can be seen in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
reaction, to Reed’s attendit to move b^ond abortion to other issues. Anti^abortion 
activists criticized the Coalition for softening on abortion and the Coalition was accused of 
hewing to elect two Republican senators, Paul Coverdell of Georgia and Kay Bailey 
Hutchinson in Texas, ^ o  fovor abortion rights. “We cannot — in the name of the 
Christian Right — conqiromise i ^ t  God gave Moses on Mount Sinai We cannot — in 
the name of the Christian Coalition — sell out the law of heaven for short-term political 
gain,” said Randall Terry, leader of the Pro-Life movement in ^eeches delivered at church 
gatherings throu^out the south titled “The Sell-Out of the Christian Right.” “Certain 
Christian leaders are in^iring droves of Christians to move into the ‘big tent’ of the 
Republican party, a tent happily housing child-killers and sodomites,” Terry Randall said 
(Maxwell, 1994).
At the Road to ^ctory conference in 1993, several ^eakers rejected Reed’s 
“wider net ” approach. Patrick Buchanan denounced multi-cutturalism as “an across-the- 
board assault on our Anglo-American heritage. Our culture is superior because our 
religion is Christiania and that is the truth that makes men free.” Buchanan dismissed 
pleas from Republicans to distance the party from the antirabortion movement: “ffi a 
political party will turn its back on 4,000 unborn children done to death every day in this 
country, then it is time to find a new party” (Conn, 1993a). At the conference, Bennett 
said, ‘I t’s fine for you to expand your focus but don’t forget who you are. You are not 
the Lower Taxes Coalition, not the Free Trade and Full Enqiloyment Coalition, not even 
the American Empowerment Coalition. You are the Christian Coalition. You can’t be all 
things to all people. He [Christ] wasn’t. He, after all, was and is one thing to all people”
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(Conn, 1993d, P.5).
The dietoric was in opposition to the new dnection set by Reed and other 
Coalition leaders. Rogers told a workshop during the conference that members must stop 
using ‘Christianese’ which frightens the average citizen. “Our ultimate objective is to 
serve and glorify the Lord God. But, in the public policy arena, our immediate objective is 
not to win souls. It is to take the values we believe and translate them into public policy” 
(Conn, 1993d, p. 6).
Reed reiterated that thought recommending Coalition members ah»  their language 
to make it appeal to a broader audience. “Those ofus i^ o  bear IBs name have a unique 
obligation to choose words that represent our Lord in a way that reaches others and 
makes knoWedge acceptable,” he said (Reed, 1994, p. 68). “Too ofrm those of devout 
frith have spoken in the public square with a scowl, using language that did not embrace 
aU their listeners” (Reed, 1994, p. 67). He advises his followers to soften their language 
just as Paul ‘learned to peak the language of his listeners so they might receive his 
message” (Reed, 1994, p. 221).
In p ite  of the dissention within the organization and its party of choice, the 
Christian Coalition continues to grow in numbers and in strength, hi earfy 1994, the 
Coalition launched a $1.4 million lobbying drive against President Clinton’s health care 
plan that received partial credit for the plan’s defeat (lost, 1994). The Road to Victory 
Conference in September of 1994 was attended by 3,000 delegates and the Coalition now 
claims more than 1.8 million dues-paying members. The 1994 conference drew 
presidential contenders Dan Quajie, Tomessee Gov. Lamar Alexander, Senator Hiil
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Gramm of Texas, and Dick Chen^, former secretary of defense. Senate Mnority Leader 
Bob Dole was represented by his wife. At the conference, Reed said, “We are fed up with 
Clinton-stjie liberalism and in six weeks it’s going to end” (lost, 1994, p. 892). Six weeks 
later, the Republican Party took over Congress.
At the 1994 conference, Robertson issued a bfamt warning, “There are some 
members of the Republican Parfy who say they don’t need us. They find the social and 
moral issues an embarrassment. We have no intention of advocating bizarre positions 
which win lose elections but, we also have no intention o f surrendering our deeply held 
moral stands just to please a handfiil of moderates vAio don’t  stand for anything,” he said 
(lost, 1994).
Later, Reed said the election of 1994 was more than a partisan victory. Tt was a 
victory for ideas and ideals. It was a landslide for a particular kind of change: pro-life, 
pro-femily, iow-tax, and unapologeticaUy committed to restoring traditional values”
(Reed, 1995b, p. 310).
Reed’s “wider net” approach addresses the rhetorical problems of the Maintenance 
Stage i^ c h  requires a “statesman or administrator who can appeal to diparate elements 
of the movmnent” (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989, p. 29). Reed has evolved firomthe 
fiery “agitator” to the statesman/dplomat whose primary concern is maintaining the 
movement, increasing its political influence and financial power while waiting for the next 
triggering event that will rejuvenate the movement and push it on to victory (Stewart, 
Smith, and Denton, 1989).
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CONCLUSION
Discussion
In p ite  of Bennett’s warning, the Christian Coalition has effectively been “all 
things to all people” or, more accuratefy, has been able to adjust its messages to match the 
values of the individual members of its audience. By identifying each voter’s ‘Issue 
burden ” and tafloiing the message to suit that burden, the Coalition has managed to avoid 
much of the divisiveness that usually ensues once a grotp begins to broaden its scope 
(Stewart, Smith and Denton, 1989).
A lack of visibility in the media usualfy pells death to a social movement (Stewart, 
Smith and Denton, 1989) but the Christian Coalition has consciousfy avoided media 
attention and has turned that lack of attaition into a benefit. Until the 1994 election, 
communication technology allowed the Coalition to avoid the media potlight and still 
broadcast its message to a large audience. The group managed to “sneak in ” to politics on 
a local level and, through the use of “stealth tactics,” build a grass-roots following that 
provided the impetus for success on the national level in 1994.
By encouraging members to be less than candid about the group’s ideology, 
agenda and ultimate goals, the Coalition increased its membershp and political strength.
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Leaders encouraged drawing attention away firomthe group’s conservative religious 
history so as not to “scare off’ potential sipporters who may not share the groip’s beliefo. 
The strategies for the 1994 elections called for stepping away from the abortion issue in 
order to make Religious R i^ t candidates more palatable to the majority of voters who 
hold pro-dtoice views.
Whether these tactics were influential in the 1994 “Republican Revolution” is a 
matter of debate but the magnitude of the GOP victory is not. hi that election. 
Republicans gained 54 seats in the House and took control for the first time since 1953 
and, in the Senate, Republicans gamed eight seats and majority-party control (Moen, 
1995b). The Republican victory ratified the significance of the Religious Right, quailed 
talk of “stealth candidates,” and belied theories that the Religious Right had damaged the 
GOP and cost it the 1992 presidential election. Moen argues that the Religious Right was 
more a beneficiary than an instigator o f the 1994 Republican landslide. Pre-election 
analysis suggested that 40 to 60 congressional candidates were at least marginal^ involved 
with the Christian Right while post-election analysis found that seven to 10 backed by the 
Religious Right won House races (Moen, 1995a).
An ironic consequence of limited success, or even the appearance of success, for a 
social movement is that it motivates and mobilizes opponents (Bruce, 1988). In the years 
that have passed since the 1994 election, the Christian Coalition has had to foce the 
paradox success creates. Once the aggressive outsider, the organization found itself in a 
defenave position as it prepared for the 1996 national elections (hfiebuhr, 1996c).
The group’s tactics and claim to nonpartisan status have come under attack On
75
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July 30, 1996, the Federal Electian Commission filed suit in U.S. District Court charging 
that the Christian Coalition violated federal law hy fidling to reveal expenditures fi>r voter 
guides and voter idoriification programs and claims the group’s sipport of Republican 
candidates amounts to an illegal corporate contribution. The Christian Coalition is 
sticking to its claim that it is simply educating voters in a nonpartisan way but the news 
that the suit had been filed discouraged some pastors firom distributing voter guides during 
the 1996 election (Niebuhr, 1996b). While commissioners agreed to file the lawsuit, th ^  
did not require that the Coalition register as a polMcal action committee because several 
members disagreed with the general counsel’s position that the group acts as a political 
action committee (EEC Rles, 1996).
In spite of the dissention within the organization and its party of choice, the 
Christian Coalition still wields powerfiil influence. The Road to Victory Conference in 
September of 1994 was attended by 3,000 and the convention of 1996 was attended by 
4,000 delegates. In 1996, nearfy one third of the 1,990 delegates to the Republican 
National Convention were members of the Christian Coalition or strong supporters of the 
group’s agenda. The convention delegates were combined into a formidable force by 
state-of-the-art conputer and communications equpment for polling, rumor control and 
message delivery (Postman, 1996).
Was the Religious Right to blame for Dole’s fidlure to recapture the presidency for 
the Republicans or did he lose because he fidled to address “^ ro-fiunily” moral issues? 
(Feldmann, 1996). Dole hardfy mentioned abortion during the 1996 canpaign and during 
an appearance at the 1996 Road to \^ctory Conference he focused on his pledge to cut
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taxes. Late m his peech, he promised to bar late-tenn abortions to wbich the audience 
reponded with the most prolonged pplause (hfiebuhr, 1996c). The Relpious Right’s 
voice was muted during the Republican convention when no religious conservative 
peakers were seen on the podium during network broadcasts (EdsalL, 1996a).
Bruce argues that the Religious Right has enough power to put its concerns on the 
public agenda but is not united enough on socio-moral issues or on which policies to 
support to effect substantial change. The author said the finilt fies in the group’s lack of 
understanding the need to accommodate other groups and in a lack of unity on priorities. 
This theory is illustrated best by conflicts that have arisen over whether voters can be 
trusted to enact public pofi(y. in Texas, battles are being fought over whether to abandon 
support for initiatives and referenda. “Do we want to run the risk that such issues as 
homosexual marriage, right to fife, right to carry (gun) laws, tort reform, home schooling 
and casino gambling would be decided by a poorfy informed, growingfy apathetic 
electorate?” asked Shirley SpeUerberg of the Texas Eagle Forum (EdsalL, 1996b). It may 
be suggested that this is a strange way for a leader of a populist movement to talk
The lack of sustained success on the national level, Bruce claims, demonstrates the 
exaggerated influence of the mass media and points out that televangefism does not form a 
homogenous group equally committed to all positions presented. The movement 
illustrates the theory that mass media reinforces existing opinion and is better at 
reinforcing general opinions rather than promoting pecific positions (Bruce, 1988).
A debate rages among scholars as to whether the power of the Religious Right is 
rising or fldfing and over the actual strength of its influence. Some, sudi as sociologists
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Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe, believe the R elions Right has all the tools necessary to 
launch a successfiil “cultural révolution” (Moen, 1995a) while Bruce has argued that the 
Christian Right has already foiled to reshape America and its power to do so is decreasmg 
(Bruce, 1988). Moen sees the movement movmg into a “fourth wave” of poMcal 
activism and claims the group’s influence will continue to be felt for some time to come 
(Moen, 1995a).
Reed’s and the Coalition’s efforts to expand its agenda and to widen its appeal 
have suffered from a backlash effect In pite o f the common ground Reed sees between 
conservative evangelicals and Catholics, attempts to appeal to Catholics have met with 
strong resistance during the 1996 election when bishops refiised to distribute voter guides 
and denounced association with the Catholic Alliance, the Catholic arm of the Christian 
Coalition. Of the Coalition’s claimed 1.7 million members, only about 250,000 are 
Catholic (Goodstein, 1996a). A sample voter guide featuring the photogrph of a 
fictitious Black candidate opposing Religious Right issues made the African-American 
community supicious of Reed’s avowed condemnation of a rash of arson of Black 
churches (Hohnes, 1996).
Even before the 1996 election, Reed was already retracing his rhetorical stp s to 
repond to criticism that the Coalition had abandoned the high ground on moral issues in 
fovor o f economic issues. In an interview on Robertson’s 700 Chib in May 1996, Reed 
explained the focus of his latest book. Active Faith:
Every great political movmnent in American history has arisai from the churches.
The labor unions originally came out of the church, the suffragist movement came
out of the church, the anti-slavery movement, the civil-rights movement Every
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transfoimatioiial, political movement wasn’t  about profits, it wasn’t  about prime 
interest rates. It was about foitb in God and about America restormg the 
righteousness.
My argument is that the collapse of liberalism under Bill Clinton is because it has 
turned its back on that religious heritage. And the rise of the right is because it is 
no longer fueled by a sort o f accounting or bookkeeper’s desire to balance the 
budget. It is fiieled by a sense of right and wrong and by morality and immorality. 
(Ralph Reed comnooits, 1996).
Reed called Roe Vs. Wade a “critical moment” in the exodus of the religious from 
the Democratic party. “At that point, it no longer became acceptable to be devoutfy 
religious and pro-life in the Democratic Party. People like Bob Casey and. . .  Ted 
Kennedy eloquentfy says that he will never give ip  on peaking out on bdialf of the 
unborn. A1 Gore co-ponsored a human life amendment to the Constitution. . .  And 
every one of these major liberal figures had to leave their religious convictions on the 
doorstep of the party in order to maintain their electoral viability.” (Ra^h Reed 
comments, 1996).
In réponse to charges he is giving up his hard-fi>u^t princples, Reed said, “God 
hates the sin and loves the sinner. I think that the stjde of our peedi and the manner of 
our politics ought to r^ e c t his love for those w&o are hurting and those who are in sin. . .  
With regard to protection of innocent human life, the unborn, with regard to opposing 
same-sex marriages and gay rights and so forth, I will never retreat. I wiH never walk 
away from that agenda and neither wiH the Christian Coalition and I think people know 
that” (Ralph Reed comments, 1996).
This language is in marked contrast to the Coalition’s earlier rhetoric on abortion
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as exemplified by the group’s “Contract with the American Famify ” The legislative 
agenda published in 1995 calls fixr protecting states riÿbts on abortion, limiting late-term 
abortions, and eliminating fimding fixr organizations that promote and perform abortions 
but stops short of calling for a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion (Christian 
Coalition presents, 1995).
During the 1996 Road to Victory Conference in Washington, Reed reminded Dole 
that “man does not live be bread alone, ” and warned that the emphasis on economics 
would threaten support among conservative Christians. “To the Republican Party we say 
this: ffyou want to retain control of the House and Senate, and you want to have any 
chance of gaining the White House, you had better not retreat fi'om the pro-life and pro- 
frmify stands that made you a majority party in the first place” (Ihitchenson, 1996). Reed 
warned Republicans that “T think clearly the tax message is inportant but (if the 
presidential campaign is to succeed) thQr have to talk about the culture, the frmdy and the 
state of values in American society” (EdsaH, 1996c, p. A12).
At the 1996 convention, the “redemptive” language Reed previousfy cautioned 
against was back in full glory. “We serve a risen Lord,” he said, “He is alive, and He’s 
coming back again very, very soon.” Reed expressed hope the returning Savior would 
look on the results of the 1996 election and say, “Well done, good and faithful servants” 
(Hutchenson, 1996).
On ^ r ü  23,1997, Ral^h Reed announced his resignation as executive director of 
the Christian Coalition. T believe and hope and trust my work in the political arena is not 
over,” Reed said. “Rut I believe that my work at the Christian Coalition is done” (Yang
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and Goodstein, p. A6). Reed said he was resigning to form his own polMcal consulting 
firm, called Century Strategies, wdiidi wQl woritto heÿ elect “^ ro-fifo, pro-fiunily and pro- 
firee enterprise candidates at every level of government” (Yang and Goodstein, 1997, p. 
A6).
Political anafysts are peculating that Reed resigned because he felt he could 
achieve more for the Religious R i^ t movement from outride the Coalition than from 
within it. “Refore, his politics had to be baptized. Now they don’t,” said William Bennett 
(Balz, 1997, p. A ll). There is also peculation that Reed became fiustrated with working 
in Pat Robertson’s shadow and feels he can be more effective in promoted Christian Right 
issues by distancing himself from Robertson (Balz, 1997)
Reed’s resignation puts the fiiture of the Coalition in doubt. “R a^h Reed has been 
the Christian Coalition,” said Michael Cromartie, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public 
Policy Center. “Unless th ^  get a highfy visible person to rplace him, I don’t think the 
Christian Coalition win have the same high profile th^r had in the past” (Yang and 
Goodstein, 1997, p. A6).
Conclusion
As the Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s Life Cycle Theory (1989) indicates, social 
movements do not evolve in a linear manner. Their evolution is more likefy to be in a 
circular pattern with later stages regenerating earlier stages. This examination of the Life 
Cycle of the New Religious Right has shown how this circular or cyclical model operates 
in a practical situation. The communication strategies Pat Robertson, Ra^h Reed and
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other leaders have enployed to address the problems o f the Maintenance Stage of the 
movement’s existence are ahea<fy creating a backlash among members of the movement 
and resistance from outside the movement.
Further attenpts on the part of movemmt leaders to soften dietoric and back away 
form controversial issues in an attenpt to attract broader sipport will probably cause 
dissatisfoction among long-time supports and could force the movement to revert to 
earlier stages. Failure to attract a broader power base wiH result in foihire to enact the 
social reforms the movement demands. If no progress is seen, members will become 
frustrated and either leave the movement or again force a reversion to an earlier, more 
active stage.
This study has also shown that new communication technologies are having 
significant influence on the evolution of the New Christian Right. As new media are 
developed which allow movement leados to communicate directfy with members of the 
public, the influence of mediated communication channels will be missing from the 
process. The revolution in information delivery technology wiH have a profound inpact 
on the evolution of social movements of the fiiture and will necessitate a reexamination of 
existing theory.
Implications for Further Research
Whether the Christian Right is gaining strength or losing it, there are many lessons 
to be learned from its enduring success. The Religious Right is one of the first social 
movements to make effective use of recent advances in mass communication technology.
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The Moral Majority Triumvirate pioneered the use of dhect mail for fond raising and 
political mobilization and the practice was elevated to a science under the artfol direction 
of Ralph Reed. Avoiding the established mass media and communicating direcdy with 
constituencies through cable television, telemarketing, and direct mail represents a brand 
new way of developing grassroots activism. Further research on the tactics and strategies 
employed may point to a conpletefy new road map for charting the evolution of modem 
social movements. Further study of the group’s communication strategies and careful 
watch on its continued evolution may require that the “textbook ” on social movemaits be 
rewritten to take into account current technology and communication techniques.
An examination of the time table of the New Christian Right’s evolution from one 
stage to the next could reveal some enlightening information on the e& ct of modem 
communication technology on the growth of a social movement. The New Christian Right 
has been developing for more than 20 years but the Christian Coalition had been in 
existence for less than four years when it caused chaos in the Republican Party in 1992 
and less than ax years by the time of the Republication “^ revolution” in 1994. Further 
study should examine whether that phenomenal growth in power and influence was due to 
the appeal of the movement’s issues or because up-to-the-minute communication 
technology and direct mail strategies made mobilization fiister and fimd raising more 
effective.
Communication scholarshp could be enhanced by examining wAat the fiiture holds 
for the Religious Right and how the new leadershp addresses the problems that lie ahead. 
Whether the movement’s expanding power is real or a figment of the reactionary
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imagmation, established institutions will repond with resistance and new connnunication 
strategies wiH be required. The Christian R i^ t will be forced to counter resistance, not 
onfy firomthe left, but also from wfthin the Republican Party, the established mstitution it 
has so effectively disrupted. According to Simons, success or fodure will depend on how 
well the movement leaders repond to those pressures (Simons, 1970).
This study has focused on the dietoric of two of the movement’s leaders, Pat 
Robertson and Ralph Reed, but others have had an inportant part in developing the 
message of the Religious Right and new leaders are constant^ emerging. Conparisons of 
the rhetoric o f earfy leaders with that of current leaders would shed more light on the 
evolution of the movement. The inpending change in leadership following Reed’s 
resignation will provide an excellent pportunity to examine how leaders affect a 
movement, the inpact of di&rent leadershp and personality st^es, and the changes in 
rhetorical strategy that come with a change in leadershp.
The New Christian Right has enjoyed tremendous support for the issues it supports 
from right-wing radio talk show hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and his kin, but which came 
first? Is Rush Limbaugh’s enormous popularity a result, or one of the causes, of the 
success of the Religious Right? Further study into the growth in listener ship for right- 
wing talk shows could he^ answer this chicken and egg question and provide new 
evidence for the ongoing debate on the effect of mass media on the evolution of social 
movements and on public policy.
Since the 1980s, journalists and scholars have been predicting the death of the 
Religious Right. “They all presume demise, or at least marginalization, of a social
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movement striving to protect a declining way of life, rather than properfy orienting 
discussion toward the contour of a political player on the tpswing two decades after it 
was formed,” Moen said (1995a, p. 20). Other authors hold that the movement’s 
methods, rather than its message, should strike fear in the heart of the opposition (Young, 
Swirsky and Myerson, 1995). The Religious Right’s rhetorical strategy and 
communication techniques have not onfy allowed it to exert considerable influence over 
the Republican Party it has also out-maneuvered the Democratic Party in grass-roots 
politics and usurped its position as the political organization of the commoner. Political 
activists on both the right and the left have a strong vested interest in tracking the progress 
of the Religious Right and examining, perhaps imitating, the rhetorical strategies and 
communication methods used as the movement adapts to internal and external challenges 
ahead.
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